News: Body Scanner Developments

EPIC points out that DHS announced last week it plans to roll out full body scanners (now known as “Advanced Imaging Technology” in TSA-speak) to 28 additional airports. Meanwhile, EPIC has attempted to bring an action to suspend use of the scanners, and a bill has been introduced in the US Senate (S.3536) that would require deployment of the scanners at all US airports by 2013.

In Switzerland, the Zurich Airport began a pilot test involving a single body scanner on 8 June 2010. The test involved the “second generation” system which uses the gingerbread-man-like display rather than an actual scan image. The pilot test was completed on 14 July 2010, and the Airport states that the use of the system enjoyed a high acceptance rate among passengers. The results from the test are being assessed, and future tests may take place, but there are currently no plans to acquire any scanners, the Airport reports.

News: Washington Post launches New Series on "Top Secret America"

For those who haven't already read about it on the LIFT, the Washington Post began a new series of reports and features this week highlighting the ballooning national security and intelligence apparatus in the US since Sept. 11. The main page of the project is accessible here.

One figure that stuck out for me was the claim that "[a]n estimated 854,000 people, nearly 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington, D.C., hold top-secret security clearances." (Found in this article)

Also have a look at the gallery of anti-deception technology.

Swiss Intelligence Oversight Body Cites Problems with Database

Earlier this month, Swiss media announced that the oversight body for Swiss intelligence and national security activities, the “Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation” (GPDel), had produced a negative report on the state of the Federal Intelligence Service’s information system, the ISIS-NT. According to the report, the database held entries on 50,000 people in 2001 and grew to 60,000 entries in 2004 (p. 6). Since that time, however, the database has grown to contain primary entries on 120,000 individuals plus an additional 80,000 or so “third persons”. These third persons represent individuals who have some tie to the 120,000 individuals of primary concern or to some event recorded in the database.

The GPDel expressed concern about the overall quality of the data held in the database. Based on its inspection of various sample entries, the GPDel found instances where the individuals or incidents entered into the database were not serious enough to warrant inclusion as well as instances where data had expired but had not been deleted. The GPDel also opined that the database suffered from the systematic entry of incorrect data due to a flaw in internal entry guidelines. Additionally, it suspected that many of the 80,000 third person entries did not meet the legal requirements that warranted entry in the database.

According to an article in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, only about 5% of the entries concern Swiss citizens and only 12.2% are Swiss residents. These facts have perhaps prompted the Federal Commission for Migration Issues to inquire whether the database has had any bearing on the issuance of resident permits, as reported by the NZZ (citing an interview on Swiss Radio DRS).

The report is available in French here and in German here.

News: US Official Claims SWIFT Data Used in Arrest of 3 al Qaeda Suspects in Norwegian Investigation

The EUobserver has run a story stating that Under-Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey announced that SWIFT data were used to track down 3 suspects accused of planning a terrorist attack involving peroxide bombs. All three suspects were Norwegian residents and were arrested as part of a Norwegian investigation.

EU Parliament Gives Green Light to EU-US SWIFT Agreement

The Neue Zürcher Zeitung has announced that the EU-Parliament has approved the new US-EU SWIFT agreement that would involve communication of European bank transfer data. According to the NZZ story, 484 parliamentarians voted in favor of allowing the treaty, 109 voted against. The agreement will have a term of 5 years by which time, the EU hopes to have developed its own monitoring system.

Detecter Deliverable: Border Control and Internal Security in the European Union

Deliverable D14.1 was written by Audelina Ahumada as part of Work Package 05. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive summary

1. Since the New York terrorist attacks in September 2001, border control is increasingly shaped by security considerations. This paper concentrates on the implications of this trend for the enjoyment of human rights protection by third-country nationals that seek to enter or have already gained access to European Union territory. The integration in the common border policy of threat assessments and risk analyses together with information gathering and sharing through the use of advanced technology has contributed to the perception that cross-border movements, and, in particular (potential)irregular immigration are closely related to serious criminality, including terrorism.
2. In the development of a common border policy, the EU, together with its Member States, should ensure that control and surveillance over the external frontiers are implemented in full compliance with legally binding international and European human rights standards. This should include operations aimed at diverting “illegal immigration” when conducted beyond EU external borders and when carried out in cooperation with third countries.
3. The legal mandate of the EU Border Control Agency, Frontex, should be clearly defined, in particular as regards the Agency’s competencies and corresponding responsibilities. Any coordination of or other involvement in border control operations by Frontex should be governed by clear guidelines which ensure respect for the principle of non-refoulement, including chain-refoulement, and the right to a fair and effective asylum procedure for any person claiming an international protection need.
4. The integration of internal security aspects in EU border policy also affects the processing of personal data on third-country nationals. Such data are stored in centralised EU-operated databases and were originally collected for primarily immigration-related purposes. Promotion of access to sensitive personal immigration data, including fingerprints, by law enforcement authorities for purposes including the prevention of and fight against terrorism implies that non-EU citizens form a suspect category in itself. This raises serious questions concerning the legitimacy, including necessity and proportionality of the measure under data protection principles inherent in the right to privacy. It may, in addition, have serious implications for the principle of non-discrimination.
5. Trends towards “interoperability” between EU-operated databases should be accompanied by the establishment of a comprehensive, specific and legally binding data protection framework with adequate safeguards to cover risks related to the large scale storage and use of personal data. The more authorities have access to sensitive personal information, the greater the risks of abuse, misuse, leaks and loss of data. This may have serious consequences, including with regard to the prohibition of torture and the principle of non-refoulement, if data on refugees and asylum-seekers reach authorities in their countries of origin.
6. Applying systematically EU carrier sanctions regime on international carriers may obstruct refugees and asylum-seekers in seeking protection in the EU. Trends toward the extension of the carrier sanctions regime to include the transfer of passenger data to national authorities, including for counter-terrorism purposes, raise serious questions from the perspective of data protection principles. Refugee protection is further marginalilzed, while adding to the perception that cross-border movements are closely linked with criminality.