DETECTER

Did US Government Agencies spend over 20 million USD on Bogus Software for Counter-Terrorism?

2011-02-23T16:54:00.005Z

Eric Lichtblau and James Risen of the New York Times report that various US agencies spent a total exceeding 20 million USD between 2002 and 2009 for phony counter-terrorism technologies linked to a California computer programmer. Among the things which the programmer allegedly claimed to be able to do were "find terrorist plots hidden in broadcasts of the Arab network Al Jazeera; identify terrorists from Predator drone videos; and detect noise from hostile submarines." Reportedly, the technology provided the basis for the diversion and grounding of several US-bound flights in 2003. The story is available here in the Sydney Morning Herald. The news follows on charges from Senator Bernie Sanders that, between 2007 and 2009, the US Defense Department awarded hundreds of billions of US dollars to companies involved in fraud. Sen. Sanders’ assertion was based on a Pentagon report released in January.

UK citizen denied travel from Canada to UK due to inclusion on US no-fly list

2011-02-18T11:15:00.002Z

Canada’s Star reports that a UK citizen has been unable to fly home to Sheffield from Toronto because his name is on the US no-fly list. After being told he couldn’t board an Air Transat flight, he tried both Air Canada and British Airways. But both carriers refused to take him, according to the story. The Star states: “Airlines that operate from Canada have been known to reject passengers whose names are on the U.S. no-fly list. That's because many flights pass over American airspace or may be forced to land at a U.S. airport in the event of an emergency.“ Application of the US no-fly list to flights originating from Canada but that do not land anywhere in US territory has been “long-standing” according to the paper. The Star also notes that a bill is currently before the Canadian Parliament that would permit Canadian air carriers to transmit passenger information for the US Secure Flight passenger screening program.

Petition for Rehearing of Maynard GPS Case Denied

2011-02-02T15:07:00.003Z

The petition for rehearing the GPS issues from the DC Maynard case was denied this past November.

It was a close decision with 4 of the 9 judges dissenting. Two dissenting opinions were issued. The first, drafted by Chief Judge Sentelle and also signed by Judges Henderson, Brown, and Kavanaugh, argued that Maynard was not distinguishable from the Knotts case, and therefore there was no reason to have decided Maynard differently than Knotts. The opinion also took issue with the theory that aggregation of information could amount to violation of the Fourth Amendment, which the original decision appeared to promote. It expressed concern that this line of reasoning would mean that other forms of surveillance—including personally conducted visual surveillance—could be held to violate the Fourth Amendment when done on a prolonged basis. Citing an opinion from the Seventh Circuit, it also suggested that GPS tracking should perhaps not even be considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

The second dissenting opinion, drafted by Judge Kavanaugh, pointed out that the appellant had also asserted a Fourth Amendment violation on the basis of the interference with personal property through the installation of the GPS tracking device on the appellant’s automobile. Thus, Judge Kavanaugh opined that a rehearing was additionally warranted in order to adjudicate this question.

The order, a concurring opinion, and the two dissenting opinions are available here thanks to courtlistener.com.

Control Orders to be Scrapped

2011-01-07T13:22:00.005Z

From BBC News: The UK Prime Minister has announced that the controversial 'Control Order' measure needs to be replaced. The statement follows mounting speculation over an alleged 'power struggle' in the Coalition - an allegation that Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg has denied this morning.

The Coalition Government has received praise for is being widely reported as a progressive move. However, the question of what precisely they are to be replaced with remains unresolved - a fact reported with suspicion by liberals and hope by conservatives. The Telegraph's Benedict Brogan, a conservative journalist so close to Cameron some have identified him as a potential replacement for Andy Coulson, has taken to complementing Clegg's hardheaded realism in government:

As with tuition fees, spending cuts and much else, Mr Clegg has discovered with control orders that the realities of government appear much starker from the inside. What I find striking is the effort Mr Cameron is making already to ease his deputy past what will be a difficult moment when it becomes clear – as I believe it will – that control orders have survived the review largely unscathed. The Prime Minister has decreed that he will not accept a compromise that makes it easier for the eight currently held, and any others in future, to do harm. He wants to make it possible for Mr Clegg to agree.
Actually, the Deputy Prime Minister does. This is what we must start giving him credit for, and is perhaps the most significant development of the whole affair: we are learning more about Mr Clegg’s successful transformation from a politician of opposition to a politician of government. Mr Clegg can say that he has gone from
the easy life of an Opposition Liberal to a Government Liberal. He has been confronted with some nasty choices that have left some of his colleagues and many of his supporters weak at the knees, and he has compromised where necessary in the interest of taking the right decision. In government he has discovered the facts, and his views have changed accordingly. It may look painful now, but his bet is that voters will reward him for it in 2015.

Such generosity may be an indication that the government is anticipating another politically difficult compromise for Nick Clegg.

Increasing Controversy with Introduction of New Pat-Down Procedures for US Airline Travel

2010-11-19T18:41:00.004Z

When the US deployed backscatter x-ray and millimeter wave scanners, travellers were given the choice to opt for a physical pat-down instead of going through the scanner. Now, the TSA has introduced new, more invasive pat-down procedures that involve exploring around breasts and genitals and between the buttocks (See for instance this particularly graphic account as well as this account reportedly from author Erin Chase). Some early reports speculated that the new measures were introduced in order to intimidate those who would otherwise choose the pat-down into deciding that maybe the scanners aren’t that bad. Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic has stated that TSA personnel explicitly admitted that that was the reason behind the new policy. John Pistole, Administrator of the TSA, who was called before the US Senate Commerce Committee this week, suggested that the new procedures are in response to covert testing of the old pat-down method which indicated it wasn’t “thorough” enough.

Meanwhile, concerns about the health effects of the scanners continue. Four scientists affiliated with the University of California at San Francisco drafted an open letter last spring to President Obama’s Assistant for Science and Technology outlining their concerns with the backscatter scanners. They argue that official assessments of the health impact from backscatter radiation may underestimate the potential effects of the low-levels of dosage that the scanners emit since they are based on whole body exposure, whereas the scanners would concentrate all radiation in the skin. Additionally, they express concern that certain groups or individuals may be particularly vulnerable to the increased radiation exposure, and they decry the failure to publish key data that would permit independent assessment of the health risks. Both the Allied Pilots Association and the US Airline Pilots Association have advised their members not to go through the scanners. The US Airline Pilots Association further notes that experiences with the new “enhanced” pat-down procedures have involved “a wide range of possibilities … and the results can be devastating.” Others have more general objections to both the scanner/ pat-down procedures. Two commercial pilots have even filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security citing Fourth Amendment violations. A number of State legislators in New Jersey have objected to the current screening regime and have introduced resolutions calling on the TSA to reconsider its procedures. Additionally, one private individual is calling for a national “opt-out” day to stage a protest.

US Government seeks rehearing of Maynard decision

2010-10-13T12:10:00.003+01:00

The US Attorney’s Office has submitted to the DC Circuit Court a petition for rehearing of the GPS issue from the recent Maynard decision. I discussed that case in a previous post. In the petition, the government argues that the court’s holding on GPS surveillance is inconsistent with both existing US Supreme Court and DC Circuit jurisprudence, “raises enormous practical problems for law enforcement” and “implicitly calls into question common and important practices such as sustained visual surveillance and photographic surveillance of public places.” A copy of the petition is available here courtesy of Wired’s Threat Level blog (See also this post there on the FBI's GPS surveillance of an Arab-American for unknown reasons).

Schneier on Web Surveillance

2010-10-13T12:01:00.003+01:00

Security specialist Bruce Schneier has published an opinion piece on CNN. The article comes in response to reports that the Obama administration is seeking to secure law enforcement access to web-based communications data through the enactment of new legislation. See also this related post on the LegaLIFT blog.

News: Republican Dissidents using Spy Cameras on MI5 Base

2010-09-15T15:49:00.004+01:00

From the Belfast Telegraph: There are reports today that Oglaigh na hEireann, the splinter dissident republican outfit, had established a sophisticated operation of four digital spy cameras in a forest overlooking the MI5 base at Palace Baracks in Northern Ireland. The cameras, which are likely to have been there for months, are reported to have been battery powered, equipped with memory sticks and to have successfully covered all angles of the base.

With recent increases in personnel, the barracks are the largest MI5 base outside London, employing more than 300 people.

It is feared ONH, which bombed Palace Barracks in April, has used the recordings to target soldiers and build profiles on spooks working at the new spy base.

Senior security sources in London tried to play down the cameras being found, saying only that trees were cleared and a new fence erected because of concerns the wooded area could conceal gunmen.

News of the World Phone Hacking Update

2010-09-15T14:35:00.004+01:00

As police interview a former News of the World journalist who claimed Andy Coulson asked him to hack phones, the last week has seen the pressure increase on both the newspaper and David Cameron's Director of Communications. On Thursday the 9th of September House of Commons debate was the site of a series of robust attacks on press intrusion - for example see Tom Watson MP's forthright (but on the whole characteristic) contribution below:

The claim that MPs have so far refrained from coming down on press intrusion with too much vigour for fear of becoming victims themselves is replicated elsewhere, for example in a Guardian article reporting the claim of former Plaid Cymru MP Adam Price:

Price told Channel 4 News last night that four members of the committee had considered asking the serjeant at arms to issue a warrant forcing Brooks to attend. He said: "We could have used the nuclear option. We decided not to, I think to some extent because of what I was told at the time by a senior Conservative member of the committee, who I know was in direct contact with executives at News International, that if we went for her, called her back, subpoenaed her, they would go for us. [This] meant effectively that they would delve into our personal lives in order to punish them and I think that's part of the reason we didn't do it." Watson told Channel 4 News that News International had further interfered by asking Downing Street to persuade him to tone down his questioning. "A [former Labour] cabinet minister has confirmed to me this week that News International talked to my former colleagues in No 10 Downing Street to ask them whether I would withdraw my aggressive line of questioning … I felt very frightened and intimidated." Watson added that he was told that Brooks vowed to destroy him after he led the Labour coup that persuaded Tony Blair to resign. "A very senior News International journalist told me at the Labour party conference in 2006, in the early hours of the morning, that his editor would never forgive me for resigning as a minister in Tony Blair's government and that she would pursue me for the rest of my political career until I was destroyed."

News: Metropolitan Police to Look at new Evidence in News of the World Phone Tapping Case

2010-09-06T13:57:00.004+01:00

From BBC News: The London Metropolitan Police have confirmed that they will look at new evidence which has come to light recently in relation to the News of the World phone hacking case in which stories were obtained by hacking the phones of the Royal Family, celebrities and politicians.

This announcement follows claims in the New York Times at the weekend that the practice of phone hacking at the newspaper was far more widespread than so far recognised. Furthermore the detail that the then editor Andy Coulson apparantly knew about, condoned and even requested phone hacking is likely to continue to be a focal point to the story due to his current role as a close advisor to David Cameron and Director of Communications - the News of the World continue to maintain that only one employee is ever known to have been hacking people's phones and that he did so without the knowledge of his employers. The NYT story presents a very different picture:

But interviews with more than a dozen former reporters and editors at News of the World present a different picture of the newsroom. They described a frantic, sometimes degrading atmosphere in which some reporters openly pursued hacking or other improper tactics to satisfy demanding editors. Andy Coulson, the top editor at the time, had imposed a hypercompetitive ethos, even by tabloid standards. One former reporter called it a “do whatever it takes” mentality. The reporter was one of two people who said Coulson was present during discussions about phone hacking. Coulson ultimately resigned but denied any knowledge of hacking.

News of the World was hardly alone in accessing messages to obtain salacious gossip. “It was an industrywide thing,” said Sharon Marshall, who witnessed hacking while working at News of the World and other tabloids. “Talk to any tabloid journalist in the United Kingdom, and they can tell you each phone company’s four-digit codes. Every hack on every newspaper knew this was done.”

DC Circuit Rules on Fourth Amendment and GPS

2010-08-16T16:26:00.003+01:00

In an earlier post, I discussed the case of People v. Weaver which was argued before the New York Court of Appeals. Now, the Federal Circuit Court for the District of Columbia has decided on the issue of whether the long-term use of GPS surveillance must be supported by a warrant. Unlike in People v. Weaver, the DC Circuit decided the case on the basis of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution as opposed to an analogous guarantee under a State Constitution. The case, United States v. Maynard, No. 08-3030 (D.C. Cir. August 6, 2010), does have some similarities to People v. Weaver, but there are also some interesting and significant differences.

Maynard involved the use of a GPS device to monitor the movements of a suspect’s vehicle over the course of 28 days. Inevitably, as in Weaver, much of the discussion in Maynard centers around the Knotts case (460 U.S. 276 (1983)). Knotts was the Supreme Court case involving the “beeper” homing device and the drum of chloroform (See my earlier post for more details). In Maynard, however, the court seized upon specific language indicating a limitation on the scope of the Knotts holding. In this way, the DC court argued that the Knotts court had drawn a distinction between the limited type of surveillance at issue in that case versus “more comprehensive or sustained” surveillance as was at issue in the Maynard case (“Most important for the present case, the Court specifically reserved the question whether a warrant would be required in a case involving ‘twenty-four hour surveillance,’….” (p. 17)).

Thus, for the Maynard court, the issue in question in the case was whether prolonged GPS-tracking of a vehicle without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches. As in Weaver, the DC court was particularly impressed by the amount of information that could be extracted from having the complete record of an individual’s movements over an extended period of time.

Since the case concerned the Fourth Amendment, the Court had to apply the so-called Katz test (after Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967)) to determine whether there was a violation. That involves application of the famous (or infamous) “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard. Under that standard, US Supreme Court jurisprudence has established that one cannot reasonably expect that aspects of life that are exposed to the public remain in or belong to the private sphere. Thus, the reasoning in Knotts was that the use of the homing device did not implicate the Fourth Amendment since “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another” (Knotts, at 281). Interestingly, the DC court held that the prolonged surveillance of a suspect’s vehicle with GPS does not concern movements that are “exposed to the public” in the same way as the journey of the drum of chloroform from its place of purchase to Knotts’ cabin. Here, the extent of information gathered was the distinguishing factor. Although each of the vehicle’s movements on public roads was undoubtedly in public view, the DC court maintained that the likelihood that anyone would track each of those movements week after week was “essentially nil” (p. 26). Thus, in essence, it may be unreasonable to expect that no one will observe the totality of a single trip made with one’s automobile on public roads, but it is not unreasonable to expect that no one person will observe the totality of every trip made with that automobile over the course of a month. That, at least, appears to be the court’s reasoning.

This line of thought makes this case particularly remarkable. The notion that the extent of information itself that is gathered about a criminal subject could hold significance for Fourth Amendment analysis has not been adopted by the Supreme Court; yet, many have questioned or criticized the shortcomings of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, including the potential lack of differentiation with respect to the aggregation of “publicly exposed” information as opposed to individual bits. I’m not sure that any other federal court has introduced this notion – there at least don’t appear to be any other such cases concerning the use of GPS. In fact, the 7th and 9th Circuits tended to suggest the sort of result one would expect—i.e. that use of GPS generally wouldn’t constitute a Fourth Amendment search since it merely conveyed information that was exposed to public view (See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007), United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010)). If the Supreme Court were to adopt Maynard’s line of reasoning, it would mean a significant change for the scope of Fourth Amendment protection, not to mention the future of law enforcement surveillance.

But how does Maynard differ from Weaver—apart from the fact that they dealt with different bodies of law? Weaver seemed to focus on the technology itself and the novel dangers it posed—as bemoaned by Judge Smith in his dissent. As a result, Weaver appears to hold that the use of GPS for surveillance will always require a warrant whatever the circumstances. The holding in Maynard is narrower. It doesn’t subject GPS in and of itself to the warrant requirement but rather only the “prolonged” use of it. Again, it’s essentially the body of information that is acquired that is the key issue. “Prolonged” use results in the collection of too much information—beyond what one would reasonably expect to be public. That means that more limited use of GPS without a warrant should be OK within DC (assuming there aren’t other bases for objecting on Fourth Amendment grounds—for instance on the basis that depositing the GPS device on the car constituted an impermissible seizure). Where exactly the line would lie between overintrusive surveillance and permissible surveillance remains to be seen. It’s significant to note that the court expressly reserved any determination as to whether prolonged visual surveillance would be subject to the warrant requirement. That fact might, in a way, leave some room for technology to have some significance after all. However, if it were ruled that no warrant was required for police officers to maintain visual surveillance of a suspect over the course of a month and record that suspect’s movements—effectively accumulating the same body of information that was at issue in Maynard—this would be a strange result.

Maynard is interesting for another reason. On pages 36 - 37, it refers to what in German is known as a right to “informational self-determination” (informationelle Selbstbestimmung). In English scholarship, this right is often referred to as “informational privacy” (See DETECTER Deliverable D17.1: van der Hilst, "Human Rights Risks of Selected Detection Technologies: Sample Uses by Governments of Selected Detection Technologies," p. 4 (citing Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967) and Arthur Miller, The Assault on Privacy (1971))). If a right to control information about oneself wins greater recognition in the US—beyond law pertaining to the Freedom of Information Act and (potentially) common law torts—this would also represent a significant development for privacy law in the US.

Update: US Marshalls Service Incident

2010-08-11T11:31:00.004+01:00

I noted in a post on Monday that the US Marshalls Service had revealed that it had stored more than 35,000 images from a Brijot Gen2 scanner that was in use at a Florida courthouse. The Marshalls Service has issued a statement in response to that disclosure. That statement is available on the Brijot website here.

A reader of my earlier post "Focus on Full Body Scanners" pointed out in a comment that the Brijot scanners are passive wave scanners--i.e. they don't emit radiation--and as the statement from the Marshalls Service indicates, the images produced don't represent clear images of the naked body (the statement includes a link to the Brijot website with a couple of examples).

Evidently, however, the scanner also took photographic images of the individuals passing through, and I'm curious as to whether the photos were among the images that were stored.

I think I would be happier with these kind of scanners in airports than the active wave scanners. Some UK airports have also been taking photographs of travellers as they pass through the airport. As long as the photos aren't generally retained for too long, say 24 - 48 hours, that might also be acceptable.

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: Document on Body Scanners

2010-08-10T07:26:00.002+01:00

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights published a Q&A document on the use of full body scanners last month.

It addresses the following questions:

1. Which fundamental rights are at risk of being affected by the use of body scanners?

2. Is the use of a body scanner to be considered as processing personal data?

3. How could the requirements on the design and selection of body scanners best respect rules on data protection?

4. How can body scanners be assessed from a rule of law perspective?

5. Are there specific considerations to be taken into account when selecting people to be screened?

6. Should the person to be screened be given the choice between a body scanner and other screening methods?

7. Which information should be given to persons before they choose to be screened by a body scanner?

8. How intrusive are body scanners if compared to other screening methods?

9. Is the detection capability of body scanners an added value regarding security?

10. Which conditions should apply in order to address the concerns related to fundamental rights?

News: US Marshalls Service stored more than 35,000 images from full body scanners

2010-08-09T09:29:00.002+01:00

In a letter responding to a Freedom of Information Request from the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the US Marshalls Service indicated that it had a file of approximately 35,314 images from a Brijot Gen2 scanner that were created between 2 Feb. 2010 and 28 July 2010. In this instance, the machine was not being used for airport security but rather was installed at the security checkpoint of a Florida courthouse. Additionally, the letter indicated that there may have been other images stored by a scanner being tested at a federal courthouse in the District of Columbia. That machine was returned to the manufacturer once testing had been completed and “any images that may have been stored on that machine are therefore no longer under agency control.” No copies of images from that machine were stored by the agency, the letter states.

News: Body Scanner Developments

2010-07-28T09:43:00.003+01:00

EPIC points out that DHS announced last week it plans to roll out full body scanners (now known as “Advanced Imaging Technology” in TSA-speak) to 28 additional airports. Meanwhile, EPIC has attempted to bring an action to suspend use of the scanners, and a bill has been introduced in the US Senate (S.3536) that would require deployment of the scanners at all US airports by 2013.

In Switzerland, the Zurich Airport began a pilot test involving a single body scanner on 8 June 2010. The test involved the “second generation” system which uses the gingerbread-man-like display rather than an actual scan image. The pilot test was completed on 14 July 2010, and the Airport states that the use of the system enjoyed a high acceptance rate among passengers. The results from the test are being assessed, and future tests may take place, but there are currently no plans to acquire any scanners, the Airport reports.

News: Washington Post launches New Series on "Top Secret America"

2010-07-21T14:22:00.003+01:00

For those who haven't already read about it on the LIFT, the Washington Post began a new series of reports and features this week highlighting the ballooning national security and intelligence apparatus in the US since Sept. 11. The main page of the project is accessible here.

One figure that stuck out for me was the claim that "[a]n estimated 854,000 people, nearly 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington, D.C., hold top-secret security clearances." (Found in this article)

Also have a look at the gallery of anti-deception technology.

Swiss Intelligence Oversight Body Cites Problems with Database

2010-07-16T17:27:00.003+01:00

Earlier this month, Swiss media announced that the oversight body for Swiss intelligence and national security activities, the “Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation” (GPDel), had produced a negative report on the state of the Federal Intelligence Service’s information system, the ISIS-NT. According to the report, the database held entries on 50,000 people in 2001 and grew to 60,000 entries in 2004 (p. 6). Since that time, however, the database has grown to contain primary entries on 120,000 individuals plus an additional 80,000 or so “third persons”. These third persons represent individuals who have some tie to the 120,000 individuals of primary concern or to some event recorded in the database.

The GPDel expressed concern about the overall quality of the data held in the database. Based on its inspection of various sample entries, the GPDel found instances where the individuals or incidents entered into the database were not serious enough to warrant inclusion as well as instances where data had expired but had not been deleted. The GPDel also opined that the database suffered from the systematic entry of incorrect data due to a flaw in internal entry guidelines. Additionally, it suspected that many of the 80,000 third person entries did not meet the legal requirements that warranted entry in the database.

According to an article in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, only about 5% of the entries concern Swiss citizens and only 12.2% are Swiss residents. These facts have perhaps prompted the Federal Commission for Migration Issues to inquire whether the database has had any bearing on the issuance of resident permits, as reported by the NZZ (citing an interview on Swiss Radio DRS).

The report is available in French here and in German here.

News: US Official Claims SWIFT Data Used in Arrest of 3 al Qaeda Suspects in Norwegian Investigation

2010-07-09T10:05:00.005+01:00

The EUobserver has run a story stating that Under-Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey announced that SWIFT data were used to track down 3 suspects accused of planning a terrorist attack involving peroxide bombs. All three suspects were Norwegian residents and were arrested as part of a Norwegian investigation.

EU Parliament Gives Green Light to EU-US SWIFT Agreement

2010-07-08T13:15:00.005+01:00

The Neue Zürcher Zeitung has announced that the EU-Parliament has approved the new US-EU SWIFT agreement that would involve communication of European bank transfer data. According to the NZZ story, 484 parliamentarians voted in favor of allowing the treaty, 109 voted against. The agreement will have a term of 5 years by which time, the EU hopes to have developed its own monitoring system.

Detecter Deliverable: Border Control and Internal Security in the European Union

2010-07-01T13:53:00.002+01:00

Deliverable D14.1 was written by Audelina Ahumada as part of Work Package 05. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive summary

Since the New York terrorist attacks in September 2001, border control is increasingly shaped by security considerations. This paper concentrates on the implications of this trend for the enjoyment of human rights protection by third-country nationals that seek to enter or have already gained access to European Union territory. The integration in the common border policy of threat assessments and risk analyses together with information gathering and sharing through the use of advanced technology has contributed to the perception that cross-border movements, and, in particular (potential)irregular immigration are closely related to serious criminality, including terrorism.
In the development of a common border policy, the EU, together with its Member States, should ensure that control and surveillance over the external frontiers are implemented in full compliance with legally binding international and European human rights standards. This should include operations aimed at diverting “illegal immigration” when conducted beyond EU external borders and when carried out in cooperation with third countries.
The legal mandate of the EU Border Control Agency, Frontex, should be clearly defined, in particular as regards the Agency’s competencies and corresponding responsibilities. Any coordination of or other involvement in border control operations by Frontex should be governed by clear guidelines which ensure respect for the principle of non-refoulement, including chain-refoulement, and the right to a fair and effective asylum procedure for any person claiming an international protection need.
The integration of internal security aspects in EU border policy also affects the processing of personal data on third-country nationals. Such data are stored in centralised EU-operated databases and were originally collected for primarily immigration-related purposes. Promotion of access to sensitive personal immigration data, including fingerprints, by law enforcement authorities for purposes including the prevention of and fight against terrorism implies that non-EU citizens form a suspect category in itself. This raises serious questions concerning the legitimacy, including necessity and proportionality of the measure under data protection principles inherent in the right to privacy. It may, in addition, have serious implications for the principle of non-discrimination.
Trends towards “interoperability” between EU-operated databases should be accompanied by the establishment of a comprehensive, specific and legally binding data protection framework with adequate safeguards to cover risks related to the large scale storage and use of personal data. The more authorities have access to sensitive personal information, the greater the risks of abuse, misuse, leaks and loss of data. This may have serious consequences, including with regard to the prohibition of torture and the principle of non-refoulement, if data on refugees and asylum-seekers reach authorities in their countries of origin.
Applying systematically EU carrier sanctions regime on international carriers may obstruct refugees and asylum-seekers in seeking protection in the EU. Trends toward the extension of the carrier sanctions regime to include the transfer of passenger data to national authorities, including for counter-terrorism purposes, raise serious questions from the perspective of data protection principles. Refugee protection is further marginalilzed, while adding to the perception that cross-border movements are closely linked with criminality.

Comment: EDRI on the New SWIFT Deal

2010-06-30T16:19:00.003+01:00

European Digital Rights has a comment on the new SWIFT access deal signed earlier this week. It maintains that this deal has "no significant improvements from the Agreement rejected by the European Parliament in February 2010":

Unfortunately, the new adopted text still allows for bulk data transfers. The Parliament would have liked to replace bulk data with targeted searches carried out by an EU-based authority but according to MEP Birgit Sippel, "We cannot reduce the problem of bulk data for the moment as we do not have the technical
capability."

The retention period is still 5 years and there is no real system in place from the US on a binding legal redress. The US Privacy Act court clauses only apply to US citizens and legal residents. Therefore there is currently no right of judicial review for foreign citizens and residents (including EU) under the US law.

Another key critique to the current text is the role of Europol that should authorize the data transfer requests from the US. Besides the fact that Europol is not a judicial authority, as requested by the European Parliament in May 2010 Resolution, the incentive from this agency to limit the amount of data being transferred is extremely reduced due to the fact that they can actually request data searches from the US.

Detecter Deliverable: Unilateral Exceptions to International Law

2010-06-30T14:01:00.003+01:00

Deliverable D06.1 was written by Mathias Vermeulen and Martin Scheinin as part of Work Package 04. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive Summary

This paper on unilateral exceptions to human rights and international law in the fight against terrorism prepares the ground for two further deliverables under the DETECTER project, namely a policy-oriented paper summarizing the results and applying them in respect of EU law and policies, and a study specifically addressing detection technologies. It is well known that many governments have resorted to a wide range of constructions to justify, under international law, their unilateral exceptions to human rights in the name of countering terrorism. This paper seeks to take stock of a whole range of arguments, doctrines or constructions that states may resort to when seeking to justify their unilateral exceptions to human rights norms in the fight against terrorism. Many of those constructions have a valid legal basis and a proper scope of application. However, they also have their limitations, to the effect that often they affect only a specific treaty, or the availability of a procedure, but do not affect the substantive obligations of the state in question under international law. In many cases this results from the overlap of treaty law and customary norms of international law. Some of the constructions are open to abuse, i.e. bad faith efforts to distort international law to the detriment of human rights. Because of the complexity of the combined effect of the various excuses and exceptions, there is a need for a holistic approach that seeks to address the combined effect of the various constructions of unilateral exception.

Some of the main conclusions of the paper are highlighted in this executive summary. To start with:
None of the constructions discussed affects a state's obligations under peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens).
Outside that realm of peremptory norms, some of the constructions discussed have an impact upon both treaty law and customary international law, hence affecting the substantive human rights obligations of a state. This would be the case for the lex specialis effect of international humanitarian law during armed conflict but only when lex specialis is properly construed as an interpretive effect upon the scope or content of a particular human right.
Counter-terrorism measures may qualify as permissible limitations on human rights, again when properly construed. This conclusion calls for a rigorous test for permissible limitations, rather than an all-encompassing act of 'balancing'.
Most constructions discussed in this paper pertain merely to human rights treaties and do not affect the state's obligations under customary international law. As there is a high degree of substantive overlap between human rights treaties and customary norms of international law, resorting to these excuses therefore usually only has procedural consequences. It does not affect the substantive obligations of the state under international law, but precludes the competence of an international (or regional) human rights court or treaty body to address the breach of international law through its regular monitoring mechanisms.
The most relevant constructions of unilateral exceptions to human rights treaty obligations are the power of a state to declare a state of emergency and to derogate from some but not all of its human rights treaty obligations, reduction of the scope of a state's human rights obligations when it acts outside its own territory, the right to enter permissible reservations upon the signature or ratification of a treaty and, in some cases, withdrawal from a treaty.
There is some state practice of declaring a state of emergency because of acts of or a threat of terrorism. When applied under the fairly strict requirements for derogation enshrined in the treaties in question and when subject to international monitoring through the procedures available under the treaties in question, derogation is a permissible and even recommended mechanism for reacting to situations of a genuine threat to the life of the nation.
Although the European Court of Human Rights has in some cases implied that a state is not subject to exactly the same obligations when it is, through its agents, acting outside its own territory, caution is required when resorting to this excuse. Other human rights treaties and customary norms of human rights law may remain applicable, and even the position of the European Court of Human Rights appears to be shifting (or inconsistent).
Somewhat surprisingly, states have not resorted to reservations under human rights treaties with express reference to terrorism. However, a very small number of existing reservations, including in respect of the right to a fair trial, may have a bearing upon the treatment of terrorism suspects.
Some, primarily regional, human rights treaties would allow for a state's unilateral withdrawal from the treaty. In practice, the option of withdrawal has figured in the political discourse, for instance after a government has received a ruling by a regional human rights court but no state has actually resorted to withdrawal from human rights treaties as a response to terrorism.

Detecter Deliverable: Privacy, Secret Detention Centres and Overflights

2010-06-29T16:41:00.004+01:00

Deliverable 16.1 was written by Geir Ulfstein as part of Work Package 08. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive Summary

Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) establishes the right to privacy. The implementation of this right is monitored by the Human Rights Committee. The Committee has emphasized that interference in the right to privacy must be foreseeable; mechanisms should be established to prevent abuse of collected information and to ensure review, supervision and redress; and vulnerable groups should be protected. The Committee has, however, not established clear guidance about which substantive measures would be considered a violation of the right of privacy.
News media and NGOs reported in 2005 about secret detention centres and overflights in Europe as part of US counter-terrorism strategy. Such activities gave rise to several human rights concerns. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe initiated an inquiry into these matters. The Secretary General requested member states to provide relevant information. The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) prepared an opinion on the human rights aspects. Cooperation was also established with the European Parliament of the European Union. This cooperation uncovered suspicious patterns of military and civilian aircraft and indications of secret detention centres. They were also able to put political pressure on the respective international organs and on national governments. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, however, failed to follow up strongly, and the European Parliament deplored the lack of follow up by the Council of the European Union, and by member states.
Several UN organs have been involved in the issues of secret detention and overflights, including the Human Rights Committee, the Committee Against Torture, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. The UN organs have generally been more reactive than what was the case of the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly. But all the bodies have, within their mandates, addressed these matters. They have helped to uncover certain facts, but have not been able to establish ‘hard facts’ about the relevant activities. These bodies have, however, the benefit of being able to have a more continuous focus on such cases. Furthermore, they have a global focus, and may thus engage in activities beyond the European context.

News: Germany Expresses Concern over Apple's iPhone users Database

2010-06-29T15:18:00.003+01:00

From Privacy Digest: The German minister of justice, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, has spoken out over Apple's compilation of data on iPhone users, requesting the company to provide state data protection officials with details of what information on German iPhone users was being gathered, how long it was being stored, and for what purpose.

The case is being cited as further proof of Germany's tough line on privacy after previous tensions with Google Street View this year. However, a speedy resolution seems likely:

Stefan Köpsell, an instructor in data protection at the Technical University in Dresden, said that Apple could probably settle the controversy surrounding the iPhone 4 by having German users give their consent prior to the data being forwarded.
“I think there is probably a fundamental conflict between some Internet business models and German privacy law,” Mr. Köpsell said. “But in general, evidence shows that most Germans are willing to participate if there’s a benefit.” For example, 60 percent of households in Germany use a retail bonus card called Payback, owned by Loyalty Partner of Munich, which gives them points that can be used toward future purchases. By participating, consumers have given the company the right to collect and market data on their purchasing habits, as well as target them with advertising. “I would think the same would be possible for Apple,” Mr. Köpsell said.

News: New US/EU Agreement on Transfer of SWIFT Banking Data

2010-06-29T14:54:00.005+01:00

From European Voice: A new agreement to grant US Counter-Terrorism authorities access to European banking transaction data held in the SWIFT database:

Final agreement on the new wording was reached on Friday (25 January). After the draft agreement had been initialled by Malmström on 10 June, MEPs had demanded
changes to the text concerning the bulk transfer of data, the creation of an EU counterpart to the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP), and EU oversight of TFTP data-processing on US soil.
The three largest political groups in the Parliament – the centre-right EPP, centre-left PES and liberal ALDE – are now in favour of the agreement. In February, the Parliament, using new powers under the EU's Treaty of Lisbon, had rejected an interim agreement on SWIFT transfers.

Over at the Legalift Mathias Vermeulen has a discussion of some of the new restrictions build in to the new agreement, such as a ban on the use of this information for data mining, the possibility of administrative redress for EU citizens and the involvement of Europol in verifying and approving US requests for data.

In its coverage the Register points out that the European Data Protection Supervisor continues to question the need for mass transaction and long term storage of this data, and has additionally called for more oversight.

News: Video Analytics to be Used by British Army to Spot 'Suspicious Activity'

2010-05-27T22:21:00.004+01:00

From BBC News: Video analytics programmes are being developed at military research laboratories at Porton Down in Wiltshire. They are emphasising the use of the technology for tackling the use of improvised explosive devices. By automatically highlighting footage of unusual behaviour, such as going off road, captured by plane and helicopter mounted cameras, they hope to make the tracking of enemies more effective:

Andrew Seedhouse, from the Defence, Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), said: "Think of it as the ultimate CCTV system.
"An incident occurs, perhaps an IED goes off, and we can use this host of data to back track over time.
"Who was near the scene and where were they before the incident? What buildings or vehicles can we now associate with the incident?"
He said the research could help scientists to look for anomalies in behaviour and environment and alert appropriate forces before an incident occurred.

The video analytics are being combined with other methods for sophisticated modelling of the surveyed terrain, as you can see in the 'British Forces News' video below.

Also interesting is the same scientist Andrew Seedhouse's comment that the only way to tell insurgents from everybody else is "by what they do -so the whole experiment is about tracking people, finding what they're up to each day, who they're meeting, what they take with them, what they do, where they place things, and then hopefully we'll be able to track back through all that stuff and find out where they are now":

DETECTER: Survey of Counter-Terrorism Datamining and Related Programmes

2010-05-27T17:19:00.004+01:00

D08.1 was written by Daniel Moeckli and James Thurman as part of Work Package 6. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive Summary

The survey reflects a broad definition of data mining and also includes coverage of related programmes relating to data collection and database construction.
In the West, collection activities have increased dramatically in the name of countering terrorism. In addition to data collection involving air passengers, this survey also describes general law enforcement collection activities as well as those specifically targeting terrorist activity.
Air passenger information: in the United States, data mining in this area was proposed in order to identify terrorist suspects who might not otherwise raise suspicions. In the European Union, too, there seems to be interest in analyzing a passenger’s travel activities in order to identify suspicious patterns which might indicate criminal activity.
Private companies and non-law enforcement databases: in the US there has been concern about the incorporation of data from these sources into general law enforcement data bases.
Data analysis programmes that have been proposed and in some cases implemented for counter-terrorism purposes are also considered. These include not only data mining programmes but also a discernable trend of providing tools which guide users in their analysis and decision-making.

DETECTER: The Human Rights Risks of Selected Detection Technologies

2010-05-27T16:49:00.004+01:00

DETECTER Deliverable 17.1 was written by Rozemarijn van der Hilst as part of Work Package 9. You can read the whole thing here:

Executive Summary

Intelligence is a vital element in successful counter-terrorism. There is rapid development in detection technologies that aid in the gathering of information. However, there are concerns over the privacy intrusion these detection technologies cause.
Privacy is important for individual well-being, as well as the proper functioning of a democratic society. The right to privacy is vested in different national, European and International laws, which prescribe that the right to privacy may only be limited by measures that have a sound legal basis and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of national security.
From the legal and moral framework around privacy it emerges that detection technologies used in counter-terrorism should take account of: legitimacy, proportionality, necessity, transparency, factors concerning the person targeted, the sensitivity of the data sought, the effectiveness, the possibility of function creep and the extent to which PET’s are implemented.
Privacy concerns arise with the widespread and indiscriminate use of communication surveillance; the covert use of CCTV technology; the sensitivity of biometric data; and the ineffectiveness (and therefore disproportionateness) of data mining and analysis and decision support technologies.
There are also risks inherent to the use of detection technologies in general. The use of detection technologies can have a ‘chilling effect’ and can be ineffective due to the huge amount of gathered data. However, positive effects of the use of detection technologies are the ability to detect and therefore prevent terrorist attacks and the deterrent effect they have.
Detection technologies should be used, provided that their authorization is based on legislation that protects against abuse and presents fair consideration to the proportionality and necessity of the aim pursued. The ultimate assessment of the threat detection technologies pose to privacy depends on the actual usage of the technologies.

DETECTER: The Moral Risks of Preventive Policing in Counter-terrorism

2010-05-27T16:21:00.004+01:00

I'm going to start listing details of publications of the DETECTER project here on the blog. D05.1 has been written by Tom Sorell as part of Work Package 3. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive Summary

1. Preventive policing is any action carried out by police with the intention of identifying and preventing a specific crime or a type of crime. Preventive policing can include “special investigation techniques”, including secret surveillance. These carry obvious moral risks.

2. Recommendaton Rec (2005) 10 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe outlines possible restrictions on the use of special investigation techniques. It suggests that the least intrusive special investigation measures should be used, if at all, only when the prevention or prosecution of serious crime requires it, and not in a way that conflicts with the right of anyone arrested to a fair trial. The principles reflect legal privacy protections under European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, and Convention 108.

3. Liberal theory supports the approach of Rec (2005) 10. It permits the use of special investigative techniques in preventive policing if the crime that these techniques are intended to prevent is very serious, e.g. a terrorist attack. In particular, liberal theory permits the use of secret surveillance, if the choice of targets for the surveillance is evidence-based.

4. The form of liberal theory that best reconciles the demands of privacy and counterterrorism with those of liberty is a modified Kantian theory, which is less utopian in its assumptions about human beings than a Lockean theory, but which excludes the total concentration of power, as in a Hobbesian theory.

5. Liberal theory condemns terrorist acts not just because of the injury and death they cause, but because of the contempt for impartiality that terrorist groups display. Impartiality is central to the liberal design of government institutions.

6. Privacy in Kantian theory is primarily the scope agents have for deliberating and choosing life plans free from other people’s interference. In liberal theory generally, privacy is also the scope people have for forming intimate relationships without scrutiny and adopting harmless life plans (harmless means of pursuing happiness) without being subject to outside criticism.

7. Kantian theory does not justify restrictions on thought or expression of thought about terrorism or in favour of terrorism, but it does justify restrictions on actions that contribute to terrorist acts.

8. Expression of thought about terrorism, even expression of thought sympathetic to
terrorism, should not be criminalized from the point of view of liberal theory. This counts against e.g. the “glorification” of terrorism provisions in the UK Terrorism Act (2006).

9. Kantian theory implies that preventive policing can fairly employ “profiling” techniques for identifying suspects in counter-terrorism, so long as these are evidence-based.

10. “Profiling techniques” cannot justifiably be used alongside detention and trial procedures that are revised ad hoc for counter-terrorism purposes.

News: Negotiations Reopen on US Access to SWIFT Bank Data

2010-05-20T16:09:00.003+01:00

From the Lift: The EU and US have begun talks on a new agreement to enable transfers of European bank transfer information held on the SWIFT database to US authorities. Talks are taking place between the European Commission and United States Treasury and it is hoped an agreement can be reached by the end of June:

A Commission source told Euractiv.Com that “in the coming months little will be known about the substance of the actual negotiations”

The agreement will be concluded only after the adoption by the member states of the EU at qualified majority voting and the approval of the European Parliament. The Parliament introduced two weeks ago theconditions on the content of a future agreement, including for bulk transfers of personal data to the USA to be avoided, if necessary by processing them within the EU, and for Europe’s citizens to be guaranteed the right of appeal to the US authorities.

News: More European Anger at Google Invasions of Privacy

2010-05-19T18:41:00.000+01:00

From Privacy Digest: Google have admitted gathering private data on internet use in the course of the taking photographs for the Google Street View programme.

Google acknowledged on Friday that it had collected snippets of private data around the world. In a blog post on its Web site, the company said information had been recorded as it was sent over unencrypted residential wireless networks as Google’s Street View cars with mounted recording equipment passed by.

The data collection, which Google said was inadvertent and the result of a programming error, took place in all the countries where Street View has been catalogued, including the United States and parts of Europe. Google apologized and said it had not used the information, which it plans to delete in conjunction with regulators.

The Register reports that both Germany prosecutors and the Czech Republic data protection agency have launched investigations:

In effect, Mountain View may have hoovered up emails and other private information if the Google cars travelled over Wi-Fi networks while one of its vehicles was in range. The firm had previously claimed that no payload data was ever intercepted.

Hamburg prosecutors said they had received a complaint against unnamed Google workers over the “unauthorised interception of data”, and confirmed that an investigation - that could take about a fortnight to determine if the allegations warrant a full-blown probe - was underway.

Comment: John Rentoul Attacks Chakrabarti's 'Shameless' Endorsement of Surveillance

2010-05-19T17:37:00.006+01:00

Regular Independent columnist John Rentoul blogs about Liberty director Shami Chakrabarti’s appearance on last night’s Newsnight programme. He writes under the headline ‘Shameless: I Want a Surveillance Society’ - he likes to call her ‘Shameless Chakrabarti’ you see, which I presume is an attempt to imply she’s a hypocrite: ‘Oh so now you’re in favour of surveillance’ this line goes – ‘I thought you civil liberties people were against it’. This is already puzzling, as Liberty have consistently defended the principle that the security services ought to be able to use targeted surveillance against people about whom there is specific evidence to imply involvement in serious crime, though they campaign vigorously against arbitrary and unjustified use of surveillance. Rentoul’s attack focuses on her continued criticism of control orders:

What would she do instead of control orders, she was asked by Alex Carlile, the Liberal Democrat peer and independent reviewer of anti-terrorist law. After trying to hide behind trying them in court - what if there is not enough evidence for a conviction yet enough to warrant concern? - and the use of intercept evidence - not relevant in this case - she was eventually embarrassed into mumbling an answer: "Put them under surveillance."

Presumably she wants more CCTV, especially around the homes of terrorist suspects, and monitoring of their telephones and internet use.

Surveillance would either be prohibitively expensive, or intensely intrusive (thereby reinventing control orders in another form), or ineffective. Several suspects subject to control orders have already legged it to who knows where; any weakening of the controls would make it easier for them to abscond.

Given how small the numbers of people are who have been put under control orders (about 12 as of February this year) I think his argument about cost is of marginal importance, even if his assessment of the relative expense is accurate.

It also seems highly disputable that even intrusive surveillance would ‘reinvent’ control orders in another form – control orders primarily involve restrictions on people’s freedom, by imposing restrictions on who suspects can and can’t associate with, or imposing curfews and various degrees of house arrest, rather than intrusions into their privacy (though certainly the practice of 'tagging' is invasive). Now you could maybe argue that the additional invasions of privacy would always be worse than the restrictions of freedom. That would be a interesting position to take, and might even be coherent (though I suspect most would find it unpersuasive). But Rentoul’s not coming out and saying that. Instead he seems to want to have it both ways: control orders aren’t effective enough as they are, anything weaker will let the bad guys get away, but using surveillance beyond what is in place now will be just as bad. He’s painting Liberty as an organisation that is indifferent to the needs of effective policing and intelligence gathering. On the contrary their criticism of the use of control orders specifically takes aim at the claims of efficacy - take their earlier response to Lord Carlile’s previous announcement that there was no alternative to the control order regime or for that matter Shami Chakrabarti's piece in today's Times:

These orders were dreamt up by officials in 2005 and allow terror suspects to be placed under house arrest for ever without any semblance of criminal charge or trial. Apart from being profoundly unfair and un-British (the term “control order” comes from apartheid South Africa), this scheme is profoundly unsafe. A number of its targets have disappeared, and one former “controlee” had a habit of turning up, complete with plastic tag, at large public meetings attended by members of the present and past Cabinets.

And, as I said, they've consistently defended the use of targetted surveillance when the evidence supports it:

We take no issue with the use of intrusive surveillance powers per se. While intrusive surveillance will always engage Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)1 (right to privacy) such intrusion can be justified if it falls within the legitimate purposes set out under Article 8 (e.g. if done to prevent crime and threats to national security) and if it can be shown to be necessary and proportionate in all the circumstances.

What's shameless about that?

News: Internet Browsers' Record of Your Web Habits Available to Other Websites

2010-05-19T17:31:00.003+01:00

From the Sydney Morning Herald: The Electronic Freedom Foundation have been researching how easy it is to access information about a user’s internet activity. Commonly it is thought that disabling ‘cookies’ is enough to prevent one’s web browser collecting information on what websites are being visited. The EFF’s research implies that even with this safeguard the browser leaves ‘a virtual fingerprint’ which nearly uniquely identifies the user and enables websites to access information on the users browsing habits:

To conduct the research, the website anonymously logged information that most websites would normally access when users visit, the EFF said.

After comparing a database collected from almost a million visitors, the EFF discovered that 84 per cent of the configuration combinations were unique and identifiable, and where browsers had Adobe Flash or Java plug-ins installed they were 94 per cent identifiable.

"Browser fingerprinting is a powerful technique, and fingerprints must be considered alongside cookies and IP addresses when we discuss web privacy and user trackability,"

Israeli Security Expert Decries Body Scanners Before Canadian Parliament

2010-05-03T11:42:00.003+01:00

The Vancouver Sun has reported that an Israeli security expert who assisted in the design of the security system at Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion International Airport suggested in parliamentary hearings that the deployment of body scanners is a “useless” waste of money.

“I don't know why everybody is running to buy these expensive and useless machines. I can overcome the body scanners with enough explosives to bring down a Boeing 747,” he is quoted as saying, “That's why we haven't put them in our airport.”

According to the story, a Canadian transport minister has defended the installation of body scanners at Canadian airports. Political scientist Mark Salter also reportedly testified that he viewed body scanners as a “genuine leap forward” in airline security. (Hat tip to unwatched.org)

Study: Privacy Not Dead to the Younger Generation

2010-04-19T16:31:00.006+01:00

From Yahoo News: A new study coming out of Berkeley and the University of Pennsylvania suggests young people do not care significantly less about privacy than the older generation. Amongst the findings:

• Eighty-eight percent of people of all ages said they have refused to give out information to a business because they thought it was too personal or unnecessary. Among young adults, 82 percent have refused, compared with 85 percent of those over 65.
• Most people — 86 percent — believe that anyone who posts a photo or video of them on the Internet should get their permission first, even if that photo was taken in public. Among young adults 18 to 24, 84 percent agreed — not far from the 90 percent among those 45 to 54.
• Forty percent of adults ages 18 to 24 believe executives should face jail time if their company uses someone's personal information illegally — the same as the response among those 35 to 44 years old.

The sample is big: about 1,000 people, though smaller than the 27,000 the Eurobarometer surveys use (which also record some interesting results on attitudes to privacy). It's interesting to see empirical research on an issue people are all too often happy to accept quite crude generalisations as obvious truths.

I'd also be interested to see work on whether there has been a change in people's attitudes over the last 5-10 years. I have a hunch many young people who didn't care about privacy when they first started using the Internet and social networking sites have become far more conscious of privacy issues as they have become more prominent topics of controversy online and in the wider media.

Data Mining on Facebook?

2010-04-16T12:29:00.001+01:00

The Guardian has run a story on Facebook against the backdrop of the Ceop “panic button” proposal which reveals that the social networking site conducts algorithm-driven monitoring that “track[s] the behaviour of its users and flag[s] up suspicious activity.” OK, that sounds like data mining, but why is this story of relevance to counter-terrorism? Interestingly, the article states that "Facebook's international law enforcement is lead by Max Kelly, a former FBI agent who worked on cyber-crime and counter-terrorism before moving to Facebook five years ago." The article also discusses how Facebook interacts with law enforcement in the US and UK. It suggests that UK officials still feel Facebook doesn’t do enough to assist them and the UK public to protect the safety of children.

News: Airport Worker Disciplined for Abuse of Full Body Scanner

2010-03-26T15:20:00.005Z

From the Guardian: police gave a warning for harassment against a 25 year old man for taking a photo of a female co-worker as she inadvertantly walked through a full body scanner. Tabloid newspaper the Sun reports that he 'ogled her' and made 'lewd' comments.

BAA said: "We treat any allegations of inappropriate behaviour or misuse of security equipment very seriously and these claims are being investigated thoroughly," a BAA spokesman said. "If found to be substantiated we will take appropriate action."

News: US Government Accountability Office on the Cost of Full Body Scanners

2010-03-17T17:20:00.003Z

Via Privacy.org: The Government Accountability Office , the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of the US Congress, has estimated that rolling out full body scanners worldwide will cost the American taxpayer about $3,000,000,000:

The audit agency said TSA estimates each unit costs about $170,000, meaning it would cost about $300 million to buy 1,800 units, enough to cover about 60 percent of screening checkpoint lanes at the highest-priority commercial airports. Each scanner requires three people to operate. Based on the administration's request for $219 million to hire 3,550 TSA staffers next year alone, GAO estimates it will cost $2.4 billion overall to staff the machines over eight years.

They also have raised the issue of effectiveness, noting in particular that the operation of such machines on the 25 of December would not have stopped Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. The House Homeland Security Committee is due to have a hearing on the proposed use of the machines this afternoon.

Detecter partner Mathias Vermeulen has a piece summarising the growing opposition to full body scanners over at the Lift.

DETECTER on BBC Midlands Today

2010-03-16T11:02:00.002Z

News: More Details on ID Card Databases - Ministers Seeking Advice from Industry on Security

2010-03-16T10:39:00.005Z

The Register is reporting this morning that the Identity minister has announced that UK ID Card scheme is to have 3 different databases: "There is the one that holds the fingerprints and facial image, the biometric data, and then the other information which is broadly what is on your passport already and the third bit is the one that links the two,"

The announcement was made at a meeting organised by the Social Market Foundation. Meg Hillier, the minister, also revealed that her department is still researching how best to to make remote use of ID Cards work.

An example of an ID card reader, visually like a larger version of a card reader used by retailers, was available at the conference. Hillier said that the government "needed to do more work on this" and was keen to hear the views of industry about how this will work, particularly about security.

Comment: The Case for a Universal, DNA Database

2010-03-15T15:37:00.005Z

There's an interesting Op-Ed piece on the NYTimes.com site today responding to Obama's apparent endorsement of a national DNA database to include profiles of everyone arrested, whether found guilty or not. The author, Michael Seringhaus, make the case for that the national DNA database ought to hold profiles on everybody not just those who are arrested.

He argues that at present, DNA databases are 'fraught' with problems of discrimination, the disproportionate bias towards racial minorities already having prompted one commentator to dub it 'Jim Crow's database'. This is exacerbated by the use of profiling methods and 'familial DNA search' - searching among the relatives of partial DNA matches as potential suspects when full matches cannot be found.

Instead, he recommends the far more just solution of placing everybody's DNA profile on the database:

Your sensitive genetic information would be safe. A DNA profile distills a person’s complex genomic information down to a set of 26 numerical values, each characterizing the length of a certain repeated sequence of “junk” DNA that differs from person to person. Although these genetic differences are biologically meaningless — they don’t correlate with any observable characteristics — tabulating the number of repeats creates a unique identifier, a DNA “fingerprint.”

The genetic privacy risk from such profiling is virtually nil, because these records include none of the health and biological data present in one’s genome as a whole. Aside from the ability in some cases to determine whether two individuals are closely related, DNA profiles have nothing sensitive to disclose.

He thinks this would be relatively easy to administer, requiring only the introduction of a mandatory sample taking either at birth, or as prerequisites to a drivers licence or social security card. Samples taken at this point would be used only to produce one of these 26 numbered profiles, after which they would be destroyed. I think there may still be objections to make here, however, that derive simply from the administrative scale of the proposal. It seems plausible to me to worry about DNA samples being taken for the purposes of creating a profile being destroyed in a timely fashion and being kept securely in the interim. I can well believe that the process would be secure and efficient much of the time, for much of the country, but if the proposal is to take samples from every single citizen I suspect its inevitable that there will be some malfunction of the sort that has become all too familiar - the information is placed on a CD or laptop that is left on a train, or some disgruntled employee decides to start selling the information on.

One part of his argument I find even more interesting is what he has to say about how this would change people's attitudes to the security and integrity of such a database:

Since every American would have a stake in keeping the data private and ensuring that only the limited content vital to law enforcement was recorded, there would be far less likelihood of government misuse than in the case of a more selective database.

I'm sympathetic to this line of thought, but I'm not wholly convinced that it would change people's priorities as much as Seringhaus thinks: 'everybody' has been quite vulnerable to clumsy losing of private government held data on previous occasions without it turning into an enormous issue. Furthermore, malfunctions in the security of such a system might easily be localised to particular areas or sectors of the community. For example, suppose that the function of generating profiles becomes the responsibility of those issuing driving licenses or birth certificates and that these are matters for local authorities. Some will fulfil this function much better than others and thus, the security of the DNA may be much lower in areas where these local authorities perform poorly. In such a case a majority could remain unconcerned about the risk the policy poses to a minority.

Millimetre Wave Scanners and Mastectomies

2010-02-12T12:46:00.004Z

There's an interesting discussion piece on politicsdaily.com by a woman who whose breast surgery confused TSA officials following a 'full body scan' prompting further examination.

She is not upset about her experience, concluding simply that 'the takeaway here is, if you have fake body parts, you should be prepared to explain them to the full-body screening folks at the TSA.' However, a number of comments left underneath her article report terrible experiences of insensitive, and wholly avoidable treatment. A selection:

"Wow, I thought I was the only one. TSA in Tampa held me on display for about 20 minutes while they tried to figure out was was on my chest. I was put through the full body scanner also sans shoes. After I was finished, I was told "DO NOT MOVE!" "Ok, but can I please have my sandals, they have already been scanned?" 'DO NOT MOVE." I suppose they were busy, scanning another woman's BARE FEET." Ok, they were having communication problems with the guys in the little room. I figured they were laughing so hard at the scan they could not respond. I am a 66 year old grandmother, the scan had to be really exciting. After 20 minutes the "gentleman" returned and announced to all who were within a 100 foot radius, "There is something on her left breast." They must be fixated on left breasts. At that point I realized they were talking about my breast prothesis. I am a breast cancer survivor. I explained this and was told "DO NOT MOVE!" At this time, the TSA moron told another that she would have to pat me down. No, would you please step into a private area, just pat her down. I offer to whip it out. He was not happy with that idea. I understand security, but please, a little consideration. Would they stop a man with a penal implant? Doubtful. After all, this was a bomb of a boob."

"Okay, I have to comment. I had the same problem. When they did a biopsy to diagnose my breast cancer, they inserted a few metal clips to mark the place of the tumor. Because I went out of state for my mastectomy and reconstruction, I had to fly. And I had the same thing happen. Stopped at security for setting off a metal detector (this was before the full body scans) and then "searched" with the wand right there in the airport, in front of everyone...and she kept waving it over my left breast (yeah - my left, too) and saying, "It's something here." I kept telling them it was probably the surgical clip. I finally had to take out my mammograms (I'd brought the films for my surgeon, and thankfully, they were in my carry-on) and show them it was just a clip. It helped that my neighbor, who works for TSA, showed up about then and told them he knew me."

News: European Parliament Says No to US Bank Access

2010-02-11T12:51:00.004Z

From BBC News: By 378-196 with 31 abstentions, the European Parliament has voted down the agreement to continue allowing the United States' counter-terrorism authorities access to the SWIFT database of European banking transactions, citing concerns at the 'inadequate privacy safeguards'. The deal, agreed by EU governments, would have granted US access for another nine months and follows intensive lobbying on the part of the American government:

Last week the Greens' home affairs expert, Jan Philipp Albrecht MEP, said that in backing the new deal the European Commission and EU governments had "not respected the fundamental criticism about the lack of sufficient protections with regard to privacy and the rule of law".
The leader of the Socialist group, Martin Schulz MEP, said: "We want a new and better deal with proper safeguards for people's privacy."

Comment: Gambetta on In Flight Terror

2010-02-08T14:04:00.003Z

Diego Gambetta, well known for his social scientific studies of the Mafia and organised crime, has an interesting article in the Guardian about why terrorists continue to target aeroplanes when other, less well protected targets might seem more attractive.

Admitting the necessarily speculative nature of the endevour, he discusses purely practical issues: the fact that only a small amount of explosive, for example is needed to cause the intended chaos and the fact that flights, as they involve both an origin and a destination, raise questions and fears in two countries at once. He goes on to make a vivid case for the symbolic value of successfully hitting 'the enemy' in exactly the spot where most effort and resources have been expended in the name of security:

My hunch is that a reason to target air travel is precisely because it is the area in which the west has concentrated its maximum overt security efforts after 9/11. Piercing the thick barriers of checks all passengers have to go through to board a plane is in itself a success. It amounts to defying the toughest challenge, freshening up memories of 9/11, showing that even a puny David, farcically armed with just a pair of explosive underpants, can hit Goliath right where he feels strongest.
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab failed to kill, but succeeded in making the west quake in its boots, engendering a hysterical worldwide security response, shaming the US security services, and inducing Obama to resurrect the dismal and counter-productive rhetoric of "we are at war against al-Qaida", which one hoped had departed with Bush. Had Abdulmutallab succeeded in killing, the global havoc caused would not have been that much greater. He could never have achieved that by aiming at softer targets.

I think there is always a danger in trying to infer to much about the intentions of actors from the effects of their actions, particularly in the case of violence. I do, however, think its interesting to reflect on governments' (and societies') reactions to terrorism and the calculus of risk - while countries targetted by terrorists have a necessarily limited ability to stop terrorism from happening its at least plausible to think they have more control over how they choose to respond to such events.

U.S. Mobile Phone Provider Received Some 8 Million Requests for Geo-Locational Data

2010-02-05T17:03:00.002Z

Chris Soghoian has an interesting blog post from December. While attending the ISS World conference (Intelligence Support Systems for Lawful Interception, Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Gathering), Chris heard some surprising things. Counsel for the US telecom company Sprint Nextel indicated in a presentation that, within the space of a year, the company had received some 8 million requests from law enforcement for geo-locational data associated with mobile phones on the company’s network. In the comments on the post, one person conjectures that those don’t represent requests on 8 million distinct individuals, and that supposition is corroborated by another Sprint representative. This makes sense since typically police will want to know a single suspect’s location at various times throughout the course of an investigation. They may even want to check location continuously at regular intervals, say, every 1-2 minutes, in order to essentially track the suspect’s every move. Given the price lists associated with obtaining this information from telecoms (see Chris' post), a question for economists is whether that kind of electronic tracking is more cost effective than simply assigning a police officer to tail the suspect. The answer may depend on the particular level of crime incidence within the police force’s jurisdiction. Where crime incidence is higher, it may be more “economical” to assign officers to walk the beat and be available for incident response as opposed to conducting surveillance. It’s also unclear whether the +/- 8 million requests include emergency calls, where the location of the caller is revealed in the event that he or she is unable to give locational details verbally. But another interesting revelation related to the 8 million or so requests concerns how those requests were made and processed: evidently, Sprint has set up a special network interface to allow police agencies to submit geo-locational queries via computer.

News: European Parliament due to Decide on SWIFT Soon

2010-02-03T20:40:00.003Z

From the Financial Times: We have reported on the issue of US access to the SWIFT banking transactions database before. The agreement provisionally came into force on February the 1st, but is subject to confirmation by a European Parliament vote in the plenary session of 8th-11th of February next week. The FT reports that the Parliament, long concerned at the privacy implications of US access, is likely to vote down the agreement in the face of strong objections from the US:

Adam Szubin, director of the Office of Foreign Assets control at the Treasury, said the intelligence programme processing the Swift data "provides perhaps the most important source on terrorism financing".

The European parliament looks set to block an interim agreement negotiated by the European Commission and representatives of the member states. "It's very unlikely to go in favour of the Swift agreement," one diplomat said.

News: 'Climate Change Emails a Foreign Intelligence Hack'

2010-02-01T16:03:00.009Z

The lead story on the Independent today: Former chief scientific advisor to the Blair government David King says that the climate change emails leak bears all the hallmarks of a foreign intelligence agency operation:

Quite simply, it's the sophistication of the operation. I know there's a possibility that they had a very good hacker working for these people, but it was an extraordinarily sophisticated operation. There are several bodies of people who could do this sort of work. These are national intelligence agencies and it seems to me that it was the work of such a group of people," he said.
More than 1,000 emails, and some 2,000 documents, were stolen from a university back-up server where remote access is difficult. This represents a small fraction of the total number of emails for the period from 1996 to 2009, suggesting they had been selected for the most incriminating phrases relating to possible scientific misconduct and breaches of the Freedom of Information Act. The leak of the emails in the weeks running up to the climate change conference in Copenhagen appeared to be carefully timed to destabilise the meeting.

He does not draw concrete conclusions about who might be responsible, but responding to the fact that the emails appeared on a Russian company's server he speculates:

"If it was a job done on behalf of a government, then I suppose there is the possibility that it could be the Russian intelligence agency," he said.

"If it was a maverick group then I suppose it could be the Americans, but I am hazarding a guess as much as anyone else. The only thing is, I've worked within government and I've seen this in operation," Sir David added. "It was a sophisticated and expensive operation. In terms of the expense, there is the American lobby system which is a very likely source of finance. Right now, the American lobbyists are a very likely source of finance for this, so the finger must point to them," he said.

News: UK Introducing Compulsory Body Scans

2010-02-01T15:18:00.003Z

From BBC News: Under new security rules passengers selected for screening by the Millimetre Wave 'Naked Body Scanners' will be forced to consent to the scanning on pain of not being allowed on the flight. The machines are in place at Heathrow and Manchester airport and will be installed at Birmingham airport later this month:

Transport Secretary Lord Adonis said in the immediate future only a small proportion of airline passengers would be selected for scanning.

In a written statement to the House of Commons, he said: "If a passenger is selected for scanning, and declines, they will not be permitted to fly."

News: Florence DETECTER Programme Announced

2010-01-28T13:17:00.001Z

The second DETECTER Project Meeting will take place in Florence on Thursday the 18th of February 2010. The Programme will run as follows:

9.00 – 9.15 Introduction by Prof. Martin Scheinin, Professor of International Law at the European University Institute and United Nations Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights while countering terrorism

9.15 – 11.00 Identification of terrorist suspects through detection technologies: risks and opportunities
Chair: Martin Scheinin (European University Institute, Italy)

Ehud Givon (WECU-technologies, Israel) – Security through intent detection
Jacques Verraes (Europan Commission, Belgium) – Data protection issues related to identification of terrorist suspects
Ben Hayes (Statewatch, United Kingdom) – Respondent to presentations of Commission and WeCU technologies

11.00 – 11.30 Coffee break

11.30 – 13.30 Human rights aspects of the use of detection technologies

Chair: Daniel Moeckli (University of Zurich, Switzerland)

Roos van der hilst (University of Oslo, Norway) – Human rights risks of selected detection technologies - sample uses by governments
Emilio Mordini (HIDE, Italy) - Biometrics, Body, Identity
R. Leenes (University of Tilburg, the Netherlands) – Location based surveillance – why planes, trains and automobiles are the new castles

13.30 – 15.00 Lunch

15.00-17.00 Martin Scheinin presenting WP4 Deliverable on "Developments in the Declarations of Exceptions, Claims of Inapplicability, or Unilateral Modifications in Respect of Internation Law for the Sake of Counter-Terrorism"

Limited Places - To register, please e-mail mathias.vermeulen@eui.eu

Martin Scheinin on Body Scanners and Profiling

2010-01-28T12:29:00.003Z

DETECTER Partner Martin Scheinin has a piece in the Guardian. He argues against the idea that the aim of preventing acts of terrorism always trumps privacy or other fundamental rights and that any restrictions of such rights ought to be specifically provided for in clear law ensuring their effectiveness, necessity and proportionality. A few select quotes:

...The current generation of body scanners entail an unnecessary and therefore disproportionate intrusion into privacy, by showing a graphic image of a naked human person to one or more observers. It would be technologically easy to avoid this, by securing that no images are ever stored, and by using an algorithm to replace on the observer's screen the image of a real person with a standard animation figure but places any suspicious items on that image...
What is worse, body scanners are ineffective. They are unlikely to detect 80 grams of PETN explosives hidden in the underware of a person. And once it is known that body scanners are in use, they are easy to avoid by hiding this type of explosives in a body cavity or in a commercial item in one's hand luggage...
There are better ways than body scanners and group-related profiling to improve security at airports and elsewhere. The technology already exists for detecting from distance most explosive substances, including PETN. Together with professional observation of behavioral patterns this provides a prospect of respecting privacy while at the same time doing a better job in preventing acts of terrorism. It seems to be the unwarranted obsession to know more about the perceived bad person that has slowed down work to detect explosives....

The article also features a link to his latest report written in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counterterrorism, highlighting the erosion of the right to privacy in the fight against terrorism.

News: New Security Measures for UK Airports

2010-01-20T17:47:00.005Z

From the BBC: In a statement to the House of Commons earlier today, Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced the recommendations arising from a review of airport security and further intelligence briefings. The main measures include:

Direct Flights from Yemen to the UK are suspended until security concerns are addressed.
A "no fly" list is to be established to prevent suspected terrorists from travelling to the UK.
A second list of lower risk suspects will be established entailing 'special measures' for those attempting to fly to the UK, such as more stringent screening (officials are not currently specifying anything further).
All UK airports and ports to follow the 'e-borders' scheme, designed to collect personal data on all passengers entering or exiting the country, by the end of the year.
Enhanced global cooperation to enable suspect individuals to be checked against watchlists 24 hours before flying to or via the UK.
Full Body Scanners at British airports next week.
New Intelligence teams to identify threats to British security abroad.

Comment: Privacy is Dead According to Facebook Chief

2010-01-19T12:24:00.005Z

There's a nice discussion piece about social networking and privacy in the Times, following on from Mark Zuckerberg's reported statement that 'privacy is dead' (a statement, according to the article, he is now trying to downplay). As well as pointing out how careful Zuckerberg is about safeguarding his own privacy, it goes through the arguments that privacy has become less important to the younger generation who make an informed choice that the benefits of sharing information outweigh the disadvantages. A couple of choice quotations:

As Daniel Masoliver, a 24-year-old postgraduate student in London, put it: “The only reason privacy ever existed is because Facebook didn’t. People have always liked talking about what they’re into and the more people share information with one another, the more comfortable others are joining in.”

And another (somewhat tongue in cheek one imagines) from Ross Anderson, a Professer of Security Engineering at Cambridge:

“At Cambridge all the party invitations go out on Facebook,” he said. “So if you don’t have Facebook, you won’t get invited to any parties, so you won’t have any sex, so you won’t have any children, so your genes die out. So it’s an evolutionary necessity to be on Facebook.”

Ross Anderson also touches on what I consider the key point when it comes to the argument that privacy is no longer important because as a society we have weighed up the pros and cons and decided it is not needed:

By analysing...[social networking] data, “spider” programs can draw up social graphs that reveal your sexuality, political beliefs and other characteristics. According to Ross Anderson...it can be done even if you list as few as eight friends.

That might not matter so much in Britain, says Anderson, “but in a country like Iran, where they punish gays, this is serious stuff”.

Iran may seem an extreme case, but I think there is a huge degree to which the acceptability of behaviour revealed by internet activity depends on what social circles you live in. It's a very different matter sharing facets of your life such as sexual preference when you live in San Francisco, than it is doing so in an isolated, conservative town. But decisions about what level of privacy is available for users tends to be made by people who live in more liberal communities, tolerant of far more than is typically the case in wider society.

News: UK Equality and Human Rights Commission Say Body Scanners Breach Privacy

2010-01-19T11:39:00.004Z

From the Times: Trevor Phillips, head of the UK watchdog created under the Equality Act (2006) in order to uphold nondiscrimination, has declared them a violation of privacy law established by the Human Rights Act.

They are calling on the UK Home Secretary Alan Johnson to explain in detail how the government will ensure that implementation of body scanning is compliant with the right to privacy. In particular they have raised privacy concerns with the use of body scanners on the disabled, the elderly, preoperative transsexuals and those with potentially embarrassing medical aids.

An EHRC spokesman said the use of profiling was “discriminatory, contrary to domestic legislation and international standards, and is harmful to community relations”.

A source at the watchdog added: “Scanners have a negative impact on people’s right to privacy, particularly the disabled, older people and children. Transsexuals and transgender people would be particularly vulnerable.

“We are talking about very intimate pictures. To be blunt, one could imagine a bunch of loutish security guards seeing some attractive women in the queue and all rushing into the office saying, ‘Let’s have a look’.”

Focus on Full-Body Scanners

2010-01-18T19:45:00.004Z

Since the Christmas Day plot, many voices on both sides of the Atlantic have called for increased use of full-body scanners—even to the point of having them replace the now traditional metal detector screening. But how do they work and what’s the fuss about?

Operation

There are full-body scanners that have been developed that use x-rays (generally referred to as “backscatter” scanners), but the scanners that have attracted so much attention in the media lately are millimeter wave scanners. These units rely on waves that lie somewhere between microwaves and infrared light on the frequency spectrum. According to this article from the Austrian newspaper, Der Standard, human bodies naturally emit millimeter waves. In order to produce a clear image, however, millimeter wave scanners using the so-called “active method” bombard the body with additional millimeter waves. These waves are able to pass through clothing, paper, and thin plastics but not through human bodies. Thus, the reception of these waves as they bounce back from the body can be used to construct a picture of the outer surface of the body and reveal unusual objects hidden beneath clothing. Apparently, “passive method” scanners, which merely read naturally occurring millimeter wave emissions, have been developed and used in some airports (See e.g., this article from heise online (in German)). However, I can imagine that these scanners may not produce images of the same clarity and/or may require longer screening times.

Are the “active method” machines safe?

The jury is still out. The German Federal Office for Radiation Protection indicated in an article in the sueddeutsche that existing wave research has tended to concentrate on testing the health risks of waves used in mobile devices such as mobile phones. Therefore, there isn’t a great deal of research available on the health impact of these millimeter wave frequencies. What scientists seem to agree on is that the waves won’t ionize atoms within the body like X-rays and thus won’t damage cells the way ionizing radiation does. Millimeter waves will, however, warm the tissues that they strike. What tissues they strike depends on the wavelength of the wave. These waves encompass a range of frequencies beginning somewhere around 10 gigahertz and ending somewhere around 10 terahertz. According to the article in the sueddeutsche, waves at the lower end of that spectrum could penetrate a few millimeters into the skin. I don’t know whether current models of scanners tend to use waves around one specific frequency, whether they always send out waves at various frequencies, or whether they have frequency settings which may be adjusted by the operator. This article on the German Wikipedia, however, indicates that different frequencies may be useful for detecting different materials. For one official of the German Federal Office for Radiation Protection, the “big question” is whether the waves could cause other biological effects in addition to warming—such as bringing components of skin cells into oscillation or causing changes within the blood as it flows through surface capillaries. He adds, however, that these questions are “pure speculation.” For me, the question that always arises with radiation exposure is whether more frequent exposure will pose risks that don’t present themselves in simple, short-term testing. It’s not inconceivable that frequent flyers may have to pass through such scanners 2-3 times within a 10 hour period on several occasions within a single month.

Privacy issues

There are obvious privacy issues connected with a scanner that produces images of the naked body. But apart from revealing intimate parts of the anatomy and physical anomalies that an individual might not want to bare, the scanners might also reveal details such as that the person has had a colostomy, has incontinence problems, or is menstruating. Cognizant of the privacy issues, developers of these scanners aimed to develop solutions that would address them. Initially, the idea was to place the person reviewing the images from the scanner in a separate location than where the actual scanning takes place. Thus, the person viewing the image would be unable to see “in the flesh” the individual with whom that image was associated. Additionally, algorithms were introduced to automatically blur faces (an example of an image with facial blurring can be seen here). In this way, the image reviewer would be unable to link the image to an actual person. Of course, the problem is that colostomy pouches, feminine hygiene pads, devices that deliver medications or insulin, and the like still might prompt an embarrassing or uncomfortable confrontation with security personnel at the screening location.

Scan Tech: The Next Generation?

What if we could remove the image reviewer? Could we design software to do the reviewing for us and indicate where suspicious things crop up? One project led by Loughborough University that we heard about at the first DETECTER meeting in Birmingham was aiming to develop just such a program—one that could distinguish a bottle from a handgun carried in the hand of an individual captured in video recordings. We also heard from one of the manufacturers of a millimeter wave scanner who indicated that they were working to develop that kind of technology, but that it hadn’t yet matured to where it could be implemented.

But news reports today suggest that this “second generation” technology is now available and pictures have emerged from Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport which feature just the kind of generic, impersonal gingerbread-man-like graphic that we had talked about in Birmingham (an example is available here with a close-up here). Areas of the body that hold suspicious objects are then highlighted on the graphic, so that security personnel can conduct a search of that area. Unlike the original setup, the system in Amsterdam displays the computer-generated “results” directly to the personnel manning the scanner.

There are a few things to point out about this second generation of scanning. First of all, just because pictures in the media show displays with the gingerbread man figure doesn’t necessarily mean that the viewing of the “raw” image—so to speak—has been eliminated altogether. Secondly, I’m a bit skeptical as to how well this software will perform as compared with a human viewer. It seems like getting the optimal set of algorithms would take countless test runs and tweaking, and I imagine that there would still be things that the software would miss but that a human reviewer would pick up on, as well as things that the software would catch that a human reviewer would miss or identify as harmless (like colostomy pouches). Which brings us to the third point—that the software-based solution might result in more uncomfortable confrontations with security than with the human reviewer. Lastly, the software would rely on raw data from the scanner, and it would still be theoretically possible for someone to “reconstruct” the image if that someone had access to the raw data.

Access and Data Storage

The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) has obtained documents from the US Transportation Security Administration pertaining to the procurement of full-body scanners (For links, see this post on the LIFT). The procurement specifications indicate that the TSA has put significant thought and planning into the implementation of these systems, including privacy safeguards. Nonetheless, EPIC points out that, despite TSA’s public assurances that scan images could not be saved, the documents reveal that the systems would be able to store images when in “test mode.” Granted, TSA foresees different levels of access to these systems. In this case, only TSA headquarters, maintenance technicians, and so-called “super users” would be able to put a scanner system into test mode, and image storage would be disabled during normal operation, according to the TSA’s procurement specifications (see pp. 4, C-1). A note in Appendix C of these specifications indicates that super user access for a particular system would be disabled once the system was installed, suggesting that these super users would be representatives of the equipment vendor responsible for the initial setup of the system. Thus, for normal operation on passengers, that would officially leave just TSA headquarters and technicians who would be able to place the system in test mode in which images would be stored.

Nonetheless, this news does indicate that the systems have storage capacity. The question is how much. By limiting the storage capacity to only a few images, the risk of negative privacy impact could be minimized. Of course, the flip-side of not saving images is that it rules out the possibility of performing ex post re-evaluations. Suppose another incident like that on Christmas Day occurs, but the attempted bomber had gone through a full-body scanner. Would security specialists want to take another look at that person’s scan image (supposing they can identify it) to see if they can learn something from the mistake?

Open or Closed Network(s)?

Related to the issue of access is the question of whether the system represents a closed system or is linked or exposed to broader communication networks such as the internet. At first glance, I don’t see too many reasons why these systems would need to be connected to the internet. The image reviewer would not need to read e-mail or access websites to do his or her work. One advantage of allowing internet communication is that it would permit quick, uniform updating of changes to user accounts from a central office. Thus, if an image reviewer left his or her position with the TSA, that former employee’s access could be lifted for all scanner systems throughout the country more or less simultaneously. It might also be desirable to have uniform access at all airports so that image reviewers could be shifted around according to need. On the other hand, these same objectives might be achieved through other systems, such as physical access controls—using an employee ID card or the like—that would prevent unauthorized personnel from entering image viewing facilities. However, the ability to access remotely every system’s system log would allow auditing to take place on a more efficient basis. Thus, this point would speak in favor of network access. But I’m not convinced that the burden of conducting audits on the local level would necessarily outweigh the benefit of the added security. Alternatively to local audits, audit data (which does not include image data) could be exported using flash drives or a temporary network connection.

There are indications that the TSA is opting for the fully linked system. The TSA’s procurement specifications for a “Whole Body Imager” state that the system should support a minimum user database of 10,000 accounts (p. 17). That’s an extremely high number for any single airport. Additionally, the TSA’s operational requirements call for the system to have an “802.11X compatible” network interface (p. 11). IEEE 802.11 denotes a set of wireless network protocols. Thus, the inclusion of this functionality within the operation requirements indicates that the TSA would like to ensure that these systems are capable of sending and receiving wireless communications. The operational requirements also call for the network interface to be “configurable with an IP address” (Ibid.). This requirement suggests that there would be internet access. Lastly, the documentation requires that the system be able to interface with “STIP” (Security Technology Integrated Program) (Ibid.), which appears to be the TSA’s enterprise architecture for allowing communication between detection technology instruments in the field and central headquarters (See this entry on the US government’s “IT Dashboard”).

Summing Up

In sum, health-related risks are probably minimal, but currently unknown. In light of this fact, why not simply use passive systems that rely on the human body’s own millimeter wave emissions to eliminate any possible health risk? In terms of privacy protections, replacing the human reviewer with software algorithms may reduce the privacy impact for many but increase it for others. Eliminating network access would also substantially lower the risk that scan images end up distributed where they don’t need to be but could hamper other aspects of operations. All of these considerations come on top of the questions concerning the scanners’ effectiveness and necessity (See the last full paragraph of this earlier post and this from the LIFT).

News: European Court of Human Rights Renders Judgement concerning UK's Terrorism Act 2000

2010-01-13T16:34:00.003Z

The ECHR has held that the expanded search powers granted to police under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 violate Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Story from the Telegraph
Note on the case on the Legalift Blog

The judgement is currently available on the ECHR's HUDOC service under "List of recent judgments."

News: Aiport Security Technology

2010-01-08T16:09:00.004Z

Forbes has posted an interesting article today discussing various proposals for improving airport security, including behavioral analysis systems, physiological sensors, and increased use of profiling. One system being tested in Israel even sounds like psychological warfare—flashing images onto airport screens, “such as symbols associated with a certain terrorist group or some other image only a would-be terrorist would recognize” and then assessing individuals’ reactions to those images. The article also cites Jim Harper of the Cato Institute for suggesting that security be placed in the hands of the airlines in order to introduce more variation in security procedures.

Comment: Christmas Day Plot, Part I (Update)

2010-01-07T13:42:00.002Z

The Telegraph has published a story today claiming that US Customs and Border Protection had singled out Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab based on the human intelligence submitted by the State Department and were waiting to bring him in for interrogation in Detroit. This claim seems to take some steam out of the argument that US intelligence failed to “connect the dots.” This raises the question whether, under the circumstances, some other operative action should have been taken while the flight was in the air. Given what was known, would it have been appropriate to order the flight to turn back around to Amsterdam? Suppose Abdulmutallab caught on to what was happening and decided to detonate over Amsterdam upon the return. Would it have been appropriate to order the flight crew to restrain him? Think of the standards that would apply if the “suspect” were simply someone standing on a public street. Should different standards apply on airplanes?

The article also features an interesting quote from a “senior Homeland Security official” who indicated that “in-depth vetting only begins once the flight manifest has been generated, a few hours before takeoff.” This statement suggests that passenger name records are not submitted on a rolling basis as reservations are made but only once the list of passengers on any one flight has been relatively solidified.

Comment: Christmas Day Plot, Part I

2010-01-06T19:59:00.004Z

“Failure to connect the dots” became a catch-phrase paraphrasing the mistakes within the intelligence community that permitted the 9/11 attacks despite the presence of intelligence within the possession of various US agencies that pointed toward the development of the underlying plot. This phrase has cropped up again in connection with the Christmas Day plot involving Northwestern Flight 253, leading to the question as to whether the lessons learned from the 9/11 review have been implemented.

As news of the attempted attack began to unfold, reports began to roll in that the individual behind the attempt, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, had raised a number of red flags which should have resulted in enhanced screening, potentially his detention for further investigation, or--as some have suggested--the denial of an entry visa for the US. First it was revealed that Abdulmutallab had been included in the National Counterterrorism Center’s TIDE (Terrorist Identitites Datamart Environment) database (more on TIDE in Part II) (See this story from CBS). Then, it came to light that Abdulmutallab’s father had approached US State Department officials in Nigeria with concerns that his son had “fallen under the influence of ‘religious extremists’ in Yemen” (See this story from CBS). According to a report from CBS News, this information was forwarded to officials in Washington (In fact, it may have been the basis for Abdulmutallab being entered in TIDE). Apparently, however, no flags were attached to Abdulmutallab’s US visa, and the CBS report suggests that US officials who had received information relating the father’s concerns did not realize that the individual in question had been issued a multiple-entry visa by the US Embassy in London that was valid from June 16, 2008 to June 12, 2010. Lastly, it has been reported that the NSA had identified communications among Al Qaeda members in Yemen concerning a plot involving a Nigerian (See articles here and here).

The Obama administration called for two reviews: one quick review of flight screening procedures and technologies, the other a more in-depth review of the terrorist watch list system in use in the US. President Obama has promised that the results of the reviews will be revealed in public reports in the near future. It will be interesting to see to what extent the details of what happened at each stage of Abdulmutallab’s journey will be released. For me, the following questions come up: 1) Were any personal data pertaining to Abdulmutallab submitted to the TSA before he boarded the flight from Nigeria? 2) What security procedures did Abdulmutallab undergo in Lagos (or Ghana)? 3) Was Abdulmutallab subjected to security procedures at Schiphol? It would be particularly interesting to know whether he underwent a full-body scan (such scanners are evidently in common use at Schiphol) (more on full-body scanning below)?

In this case, it isn’t clear to what extent fault can be found with US authorities. Clearly mistakes were made, but even if all the information on Abdulmutallab had come together and resulted in an operational decision, measures stemming from that decision would have to have been taken in Nigeria or the Netherlands in order to have been effective. The incident may primarily reflect the lack of uniform and coordinated procedures at the international level. The US has expressed the desire to receive passenger name records for all passengers who have booked flights to the US. Yet, the question arises as to how many airlines indulge that desire and with what level of accuracy. This requirement has been particularly contentious within the EU. However, given the fact that Abdulmutallab had booked passage with a US-based air carrier for the final leg of his journey, it seems likely that the US carrier submitted passenger record data on Abdulmutallab to the TSA. But again, even if the TSA had singled out Abdulmutallab for enhanced screening or identified him as being on the no-fly list, how does it ensure that Dutch or Nigerian airport security take appropriate action? If a Dutch or Nigerian equivalent of the TSA have special requests with respect to a particular passenger departing from the US en route to the Netherlands or Nigeria, would the TSA automatically comply in reciprocal fashion? Note that according to an editorial in the New York Times, the TSA can still request a US-bound flight to return to its point of departure if there is a suspicious passenger on board, but for long distance flights, this option may become unfeasible if the request is not received until later stages of the flight.

Suggestions for changes already began to be voiced soon after the incident. Among the calls for improvements to security that have emerged in public discourse, the notion of making more use of body scanners, such as millimeter wave scanners, has been particularly prominent--notably former US Department of Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff, has been among those advocating this move (see here) (although it later came to light that Chertoff’s company, the Chertoff Group, has a manufacturer of such machines as a client). Some commentators, however, have argued that such full-body scanners would have failed to detect the explosive device in this case. The Telegraph has cited two former US officials from counter-terrorism agencies for having long argued that swabbing for explosive substances and other chemicals is “cheaper, easier and more effective” than full-body scanners. In that article, Larry Johnson, former deputy director of Counter Terrorism at the US State Department was quoted as saying “[s]wabbing everyone is not hard and it’s just about the only way, short of making passengers fly naked and without luggage, of being reasonably sure they aren’t carrying a bomb.” Although swabbing would entail making bodily contact with the swabs, for some--if not most--it may raise fewer privacy concerns than the full-body scanners. The Telegraph article suggests that the swab tests would not need to be taken from the same part of the body or baggage where explosives were located. That means that contact with sensitive areas of the body could be avoided.

In Part II, I’ll discuss databases and watch lists.

Data collection and retention policies of social networking sites

2009-12-02T16:14:00.000Z

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), working with the Samuelson Law, Technology, and Public Policy Clinic at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Samuelson Clinic), filed suit today against a half-dozen US government agencies for refusing to disclose their policies for using social networking sites for investigations, data-collection, and surveillance.

Recent news reports have publicized the government's use of social networking data as evidence in various investigations, and Congress is currently considering several pieces of legislation that may increase protections for consumers who use social-networking websites and other online tools. In response, the Samuelson Clinic made over a dozen Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests on behalf of EFF to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies, asking for information about how the government collects and uses this sensitive information.When several agencies did not respond to the FOIA requests, the Samuelson Clinic filed suit on behalf of EFF. The lawsuit demands immediate processing and release of all records concerning policies for the use of social networking sites in government investigations.

Interesting related reads:
* Myspace Law Enforcement Guide.

Because MySpace functions as both an “electronic communications” and “remote computing” service as defined under ECPA (Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701), ECPA mandates that MySpace disclose certain user information only in response to specific types of government process, including subpoenas, court orders, and search warrants.Generally speaking, ECPA permits the disclosure of basic user identity, log-in information, and stored files (photos, videos, blogs) in response to a subpoena, but requires a court order under § 2703(d) to disclose additional user records, or search warrant to authorize disclosure of private user messages. The rules may differ also depending on whether law enforcement seeks stored, historical information, or to capture information prospectively. For example, if law enforcement seeks ongoing information about a user’s IP address each time they log-in to their account, the law would require a pen register/trap and trace order.

MySpace permits users to exchange private mail messages with other MySpace members. These communications are sent from and held for users on MySpace servers. ECPA generally restricts disclosure of private user communications less than 180 days old except in response to a search warrant. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).

Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(8) and 2702(c)(4), MySpace is permitted to disclose information, including user identity, log-in, private messages and other information voluntarily to a federal, state, or local governmental entity when MySpace believes in good faith that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires such disclosure without delay.

Data retention
The basic identity information entered by a user in creating a profile, as well as data (blog entries, user profile information, etc.) and images contained in an account are maintained as long as the user has not removed or edited the content from the profile. Once a change is made by the user, the previously existing information is overwritten.

Private inbox messages -- Private messages are retained until the user removes them (MySpace cannot recover deleted messages).

Private sent messages -- 14 days

User identity and date in the user profile is generally available for up to ten days after account deletion. Other stored files, such as photos, may be lost at the time of account deletion.

No mail (inbox or sent mail) is available for deleted accounts.

MySpace will honor requests by law enforcement to preserve information in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f). In response to such requests, MySpace will preserve the specific information identified in the request for 90 days, and for an additional 90 days if the law enforcement entity requests the original period be extended.

* Old Facebook Subpoena/Search Warrant Guidance. Less detailed than myspace.

Types of information available

The User Neoprint, which includes
• Profile Contact Information
• Mini-Feed
• Status Update History
• Shares
• Notes
• Gifts, Public and Private
• Wall Postings
• Messages
• Friend Listing, with Friends Facebook ID’s
• Groups Listing, with Facebook Group ID’s

All user contact information input by the user and not subsequently deleted by the user is available, regardless of whether it is visible in their profile. This information may include the following:
Name
Birthdate
Contact email addresses
Address
City
State
Zip
Phone
Cell
Work phone
Screen name (Usually for AOL Messenger / iChat)
Website

If a profile is changed or updated, deleted content is not retained, and cannot be produced. Any messages or wall postings deleted by the user are not retained and cannot be produced.

Where a group is known, we will provide a list of users currently registered in a group.

News: US SWIFT Access Granted

2009-12-01T14:54:00.001Z

From the Lift: The EU has agreed a nine month interim deal to allow the US non reciprocal access to SWIFT banking data. Germany and Austria, reported as threatening a veto over the privacy implications of such a deal, abstained. A unanimous vote was required, not counting abstentions as votes against. The agreement can be annulled in the Spring, when the European Parliament will have to give their assent to the plan.

The Register quotes an EU official as saying that "The truth is that we in Europe don’t have the technical ability to interpret this stuff," and that this is the reason why "We rely on the Americans to process it and pass it on as intelligence." Many European intelligence agencies end up as beneficiaries in the arrangement as they are not permitted by their home countries to gather such information themselves. In the event, delegates were apparantly put under huge pressure from US representatives to pass the deal:

The pressure from the Americans was "massive," say diplomats in Brussels. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton apparently told her European counterparts that the fate of the West hung in the balance. And in the capital cities of Europe, American ambassadors stormed governments like door-to-door salespeople. As one EU foreign minister put it, "they pulled out all the moral and political stops."

News: SWIFT Update

2009-11-26T11:19:00.004Z

The Legalift reported last week that 4 Countries remain opposed to the draft agreement granting US access to SWIFT banking transfers records. Germany's justice minister says that Berlin is uncomfortable with the plan and France, Austria and Finland have also signalled discontent with the scheme.

The draft plan is significantly different from the resolution issued by the European Parliament on the issue. 'Terrorism' is left undefined, requirements for judicial oversight are nowhere to be seen and the restriction of access to the specific issue of 'terrorism financing' is loosened to "prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist financing". Ralf Bendrath has a round up of all these issues and many more.

If a decision is not reached by November 30th, then, as the Lisbon Treaty kicks in on December the 1st, the European Parliament may have much more say in the process (and it is likely to take another 6 months). Germany and Austria are reported to be under pressure to drop their opposition.

News: IMP Still Budgetted for 2016 Release

2009-11-26T11:07:00.002Z

After mention was left out of the Queen's Speech, there was a lot of speculation that, in response to political pressure, plans for the Interception Modernisation Programme to monitor all electronic communications had been abandoned.

The Register reveals that the £2Bn remains in the Home Office's financial plans, scheduled for completion in 2016.

News: Facial Recognition Technology to be used at Cardiff Airport

2009-11-26T10:21:00.003Z

Frome the Register: Cardiff now joins Manchester Airport in allowing inbound passengers to have their passports checked automatically with facial recognition systems. The option is available for adults with chipped biometric passports, issued since 2006, which, amongst other information, have a picture of the holder encoded on them that can be compared to the subject checking through.

The article refers to the embarassing revelations last year that facial recognition technology in use at Manchester airport was unable to distinguish between pictures of Wynona Ryder and Osama Bin Laden. This happened because the machines initially gave far too many false negatives, and in reponse staff turned the settings so low they effectively 'switched them off'.

News: Biometrics to be Used to Identify 'Outsiders' in Afghanistan

2009-11-18T14:42:00.002Z

From the Sunday Times: in Afghanistan biometrics such as fingerprints, retina scans or DNA tests are being proposed as a means to draw up "gated communities" in which outsider 'rebels' can be swiftly identified. In Basra, patrolling US soldiers are being issued with iPODs with a list of all local people.

Brigadier James Cowan, the new commander of British forces in Afghanistan, gave an interview to the Sunday Times in which he emphasised the importance of reassuring the local population of UK and US ability to provide security.

For the brigadier it is all about challenging the Taliban’s rule of fear: “What you have to do is create communities where people wish to be separate from the enemy because they have the confidence to be separate from them.”

Cowan’s staff have embarked on a huge exercise known as “human terrain mapping”. It involves not only delineating tribal boundaries, but also family networks, land ownership and all the possible grievances that can be exploited by the Taliban.

News: UK T-Mobile Staff Sold Private Data

2009-11-18T14:33:00.003Z

From BBC News: T-Mobile staff sold customer data on to other mobile phone companies to target people coming to the end of their contract for coldcalls. Thousands of customers and millions of records were involved. The Information Commissioner has said he is preparing a prosecution.

News: Swiss take Google Street View to Court

2009-11-18T13:42:00.003Z

From the Register: Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC) Hans-Peter Thur is taking Google Street View to court, unsatisfied with the privacy enhancing blurring Google have offered in the Street View images so far:

Thür's patience has now run out, and his office said in a statement: "In its written response on 14 October 2009, Google for the most part declined to comply with the requests. For these reasons, the FDPIC has decided to take the matter further and to take legal action before the Federal Administrative Court."
AFP notes that Google has insisted it's "absolutely convinced that Swiss View is legal in Switzerland."

News: New Datamining System to Detect 'Deviations' on the High Seas

2009-11-18T13:34:00.002Z

From the Register: The US Navy is to use new computer monitoring software to detect 'deviations' in normal behaviour at sea. Dubbed 'PANDA' (Predictive Analysis for Naval Deployment Activities), the system will examine data on worldwide shipping movements for evidence of unusual and threatening behaviour:

The idea is that the Office of Naval Intelligence will deploy PANDA at its National Maritime Intelligence Centre in Maryland, where the new tech will be able to monitor tracking information covering much of the watery globe.
As well as information fed in by US warships, monitoring stations, patrol aircraft and so on, the US intelligence community is also known to make extensive use of radar spy satellites able to scan vast swathes of ocean from orbit and pick out any ships.

News: New Policy on UK DNA Retention

2009-11-18T12:35:00.003Z

From the Guardian: Police have announced that they are to retain the DNA of those released without charge. Home Office Ministers say they want a 6 year limit (having previously sought a 12 year limit) for retaining profiles. Ministers are also advocating indefinite retention of those arrested on suspicion of terrorism or other national security provisions. Those convicted of any offence remain on the database for life. The Tories say they would implement the Scottish system whereby the profile of those unconvicted of any offence is destroyed on release from prison:

The national DNA database is already the largest in the world, with the profiles of 4.5 million people already recorded. They include 850,000 DNA profiles of people who have never been charged with or convicted of a crime. The need to find a new regime follows a landmark ruling in the S and Marper case by the European court of human rights, which ruled that the Home Office's current regime of "blanket and indefinite" retention of innocent people's DNA was illegal.

News: ICO to Fine Companies £500,000 For Serious Data Breaches

2009-11-18T12:16:00.004Z

From Panopticon Blog: The Information Commissioner is to get powers to deliver civil penalty notices on a data controller for a serious contravention of the data protection principles if the contravention is:

1) Deliberate or reckless
2) Of a sort that is likely to cause substantial damage or distress

The post makes two criticisms: first, the proposed cap of £500,000, as large as it might seem, compares less favourably with other regulator's powers to fine up to 10% of an organisations turnover. Second, as the government ultimately pays for many of the organisations in question, imposing large fines may have 'a slightly unreal quality to it'.

Comment: Murderer Requests Wikipedia Anonymity

2009-11-18T11:39:00.002Z

Following up on the news that a convicted murderer wants Wikipedia to remove references to his crime. There's a controversy over what laws the various different versions of Wikipedia fall under - a German privacy law coming into tension US right to free, truthful speech. I'm not interested in this legal question so much as I am the more general question of what rights of privacy anyone ought to be entitled to from Wikipedia.

Some have pointed out that the identity of the actor's killer is a matter of public record, and so some might want to claim that placing this information on Wikipedia makes no difference to the individual's privacy. I find that unconvincing - clearly wikipedia has more prominence than a court record. Where the issue is the criminal's ability to get on with day to day life I'm sure the appearance of the information on Wikipedia makes a material difference.

Surely some information which is interesting and publicly verifiable ought not to appear on Wikipedia because of its intrusiveness. For example, I imagine the past romantic relationships of public figures could be established on at least some occasions, but unless it reveals something of legitimate interest to the public (such as a politician caught in a possible conflict of interest) such material should not be published. Likewise public figures' children, except where they are notable in their own right (as a child actor, say), should basically be left alone. (I assume this is the present policy - Obama's children do not have pages, despite the vast amount of press coverage of their first day of school, their new puppy etc.)

So where does this murderer fit in? As far as I have seen, nobody has argued for any legitimate public interest in the killer's identity - nothing hangs on who did it, it isn't necessary to any understanding of why the actor died, say. As such, I can't see any need for the information to appear in the article.

News: Murderer Requests Wikipedia Anonymity

2009-11-18T11:14:00.007Z

From EFF: Lawyers Stopp and Stopp have sent a 'cease and desist' letter to the German and English language versions of Wikipedia requesting that the page about German actor Walter Sedlmayr, remove all mention of their client's murdering him.

Under German law, as 15 years have elapsed, he has returned to having the status of any other private citizen and, it is argued, is entitled to anonymity in order to facilitate 'reintegration into society'.

Comment: What's Worse?

2009-11-18T10:21:00.004Z

The discussion of the UK plans for the 'Big Brother Database' has me wondering: What's worse, centralised storage of this communications data, or forcing ISPs and Mobile Phone companies to hold on the data for long periods of time?

Clearly this data is incredibly sensitive, and there are good reasons to want to restrict anyone's access to it. But, were such information to be stored, what would be worse? The idea of a centrally held database tends to make for bigger headlines, calling to mind, as it does, the vision of faceless government bureaucrats poring over our intimate secrets.

And the risk of government officials abusing such private information is indeed one of the reasons one would want to restrict access. But it's only one of the reasons. Surely another is the risk of any sort of public disclosure of this information. It is intrusive for anybody I haven't chosen to do so to view information about who I telephone or what websites I visit. But this information tends to be of much more interest to our neighbours, friends and work colleagues and of virtually zero interest to government. In deciding which is worse, one of the matters I think we should consider is which arrangement makes it less likely for some data breach to result in unauthorised access to my data.

Some will point to the many cases where various levels of government have proven hopelessly careless with our information (to the point of accidentally releasing vetting records with details of debt, extra marital affairs, drug use and use of prostitutes). But I don't think we can simplify this to a case of 'private sector good, public sector bad': some of the most notorious cases of releasing private information have been the fault of businesses - just think of the AOL scandal when records of people's searches were released, to remain posted in the internet to this very day. Private companies have a commercial interest in avoiding such scandals, to be sure, but is that any safer than trusting it to government?

Comment: UK Gov Plans Shelved

2009-11-18T09:39:00.002Z

The shelving of plans for the Interception Modernisation Programme (IMP) has been reported in a number of different ways. According to the Independent this was effectively 'a cancellation of the Big Brother database' while the BBC reported that the UK surveillance plan was 'to go ahead'. In this confusion Slashdot resorted to the headline 'In the UK, Big Brother Recedes and Advances'.

I think the Register has this one right. The post makes three points:

1) Next years general election (probably to take place in May) makes this a bad time to bring forward legislation that might provoke negative headlines. (Henry Porter has a nice point about the timing as well: with all the recent column inches covering the 20th anniversary of the Berlin Wall coming down, proposing big increases in surveillance invites comparisons with the Stasi all too easily).

2) Internet Service Providers, whose cooperation is needed for the scheme, are currently resistent. Before proceeding, government has to convince them of its merits and feasibility.

3) The players who want this (GCHQ, SOCA, ACPO, the Security Service, the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Agency and the Met) are not going away anytime soon:

Note that GCHQ and friends will still be around after the next election, as will their demands for IMP.

Ever the political pragmatists, the Tories know this well, and the section of shadow justice minister Dominic Grieve's recent speech on reversing the rise of the surveillance state was notably soft on IMP.

He said a Conservative government would submit the proposals to the Information Commissioner's Office to assess their impact on privacy. The ICO has already said it believes the case for mass surveillance of the internet has not been made.

News: UK Gov Plans to Snoop on Internet and Mobile Use Shelved

2009-11-18T09:28:00.000Z

From the Guardian: a previously mooted £2bn surveillance project for keeping tabs of all British citizens' email, internet use, mobile calls and texts, is to be left out of the upcoming Queens Speech, laying out the legislative plans for the coming year:

The Home Office ditched plans earlier this year for a central database tracking all phone, text, email and internet use. Instead ministers want internet service providers and phone companies to store this data for access by police and security services. The data includes who contacts whom, when, where and how – but not the content of what was said or written.
The Home Office summary of the responses to its consultation published shows that the internet and phone industry want assurances that they will be compensated for the costs involved and also fear technical problems.

Inadequate Information Sharing Again Cited as Key Problem

2009-11-16T15:36:00.004Z

In the recent Fort Hood shooting incident, inadequate information sharing is again being cited as a critical flaw in government strategies to prevent acts of violence. The gunman, Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, had come onto the FBI’s radar screen when he established contact with a radical imam believed to have ties to al Qaeda. When Hasan later underwent an FBI background check in the process of purchasing the firearm, which authorities believe he later used to open fire on soldiers at the Fort Hood base, the fact that Hasan was purchasing a gun was not shared with the Joint Terrorism Task Force (led by the FBI). The FBI, meanwhile, has issued a statement that their investigation had concluded that Hasan “was not involved in terrorist activities or terrorist planning.” Additionally, at least one military investigator was involved in that investigation, however, the fact that Hasan was under investigation was not communicated generally to military officials (see this story from ABC); that kind of disclosure beyond the Task Force requires the authorization of the Task Force supervisor from the FBI (see FBI Statement).

News: Resolution on International Privacy Standards Adopted

2009-11-09T13:02:00.003Z

A resolution for International Standards on the Protection of Personal Data and Privacy was adopted at the 31st International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners. A copy of the Resolution is available in Spanish here.

News: UK Local Authority use of RIPA to be Restricted

2009-11-06T15:55:00.003Z

From the Times: The Home Secretary Alan Johnson has announced curbs to the surveillance powers of local authorities. Computer Weekly summarises the important proposals as follows:

• raise the rank of the authorising officer to at least director level;
• give elected councillors a role in overseeing how local authorities use covert investigatory techniques;
• require voters' communications with MPs on constituency business to be treated as confidential information, and therefore subject to authorisation by a higher rank of officer;
• treat covert surveillance of legal consultations as "intrusive" rather than "directed" surveillance, meaning it can be carried out only by very few public authorities.
• clarify the test of necessity and proportionality so that powers will not be used to investigate dog fouling or people putting bins out a day early;

News: More than 1 in 10 in UK on DNA Database

2009-11-06T15:32:00.002Z

From the Telegraph: English and Welsh police have taken DNA samples from more than 5,500,000 people. Combined with Scotland and Northern Ireland there are almost 6,000,000 people on what the Telegraph are reporting to be the largest DNA database in the world.

News: Companies Clumsily Disclosing your Info may be Forced to go Public

2009-11-06T15:17:00.004Z

From The Register: The EC is considering passing new laws that would make it mandatory for organisations which accidentally lose personal data to inform the people concerned and relevant authorities:

Supporters of such schemes say that the fear of public recriminations for data loss will improve companies' performances, while opponents fear that if every breach is revealed the public will become desensitised to the issue of data loss.

News: Romanian Constitutional Court Strikes Down Data Retention Directive

2009-11-06T15:03:00.000Z

From EDRI: The Romanian Consitutional Court (CCR) has declared the Data Retention Directive incompatible with the Romanian constitution. The case was initiated by a Romanian NGO, the Civil Society Commissariat, who sued its mobile phone company for retaining traffic data according to the new regulations, forcing a CCR ruling on the law's constitutionality:

CCR has accepted the motion for law's unconstitutionality through decision 1258/2009, based on the breach of article 28 of the Romanian Constitution, which stipulates the secrecy of correspondence. Other articles invoked were articles 25, 26 and 30 which deal with freedom of movement, privacy and freedom of expression respectively.

Conference News: Madrid Global Privacy Conference & Declaration

2009-11-04T16:16:00.004Z

I’ve just gotten back from a privacy conference in Madrid titled “Global Privacy Standards for a Global World” which was organized by The Public Voice. One highlight of the conference was the presentation of a Civil Society Declaration calling for the development of international privacy standards — and perhaps most controversially — a moratorium on “the development or implementation of new systems of mass surveillance, including facial recognition, whole body imaging, biometric identifiers, and embedded RFID tags, subject to a full and transparent evaluation by independent authorities and democratic debate." Numerous organizations and individuals have signed the statement (already dubbed “The Madrid Declaration”) and you can, too, by sending an e-mail to privacyATDatos-personalesDOTorg.

Another highlight was an emphatic speech by Stavros Lambrinidis, Vice President of the EU Parliament, declaring that the growing scope of surveillance within the western world is incompatible with democratic society and urging everyone not to simply allow the expanding creep of the level of surveillance to continue unchecked. There is a danger that the ultimate surveillance society will not emerge under a totalitarian regime, he claimed, but rather with citizens’ unreflected “consent.” You can have a look at what else was discussed by calling up the conference agenda here.

One special guest not listed on the program was a representative of Un barrio feliz – a grass-roots movement which has sprung up in opposition to plans to install a system of video surveillance cameras in Madrid’s Lavapiés district. You can view the movement’s blog in Spanish here. One major complaint was that the police have not been forthcoming concerning the plan and the underlying reasons for it. We heard that the local police have cited different grounds for installing camera systems in other neighborhoods (in one case – pick-pocketing, in another – prostitution), and that cameras were needed in Lavapiés because unsavory characters inhabited or frequented the area. The speaker from Un barrio feliz, however, reported that crime statistics indicate that criminal incidents have been decreasing in Lavapiés, making the police’s explanation all the more baffling. Lambrinidis picked up on these examples in his speech to question whether many of the methods of surveillance that have been proposed or implemented could be deemed necessary, proportional, and appropriate in a legal sense.

Comment: This Week on 'the Surveillance State'

2009-10-30T14:58:00.005Z

There was a really interesting discussion of the DNA Database and the prospect of the 'Surveillance State' on UK politics show This Week last night. The show's hosts include MPs Diane Abbott (Labour) and Michael Portillo (Conservative).

Nobody wanted to defend the increased use of surveillance, and the (to my mind crucial) issue of the chilling effect on civic engagement got an airing, but what I found really interesting was the analysis of politician's (lack of) role in this process. In particular Abbott focused on the fact that very few of the measures discussed have actually had a chance to be debated by the legislature, while recent ministers in the executive see their role as arguing for government policy rather than running their government departments, leaving career civil servants a lot of influence over day to day governance.

Portillo makes another interesting claim: politicians tend to be risk averse, and thus much of what looks like an aggressive pursuit of 'a surveillance state' is rather politicians wishing to avoid any possibility of criticism or sense of liability for occasions where a criminal can't be caught who might have been with the help of CCTV, or the DNA database say. It is because the argument against increases in surveillance is more difficult to make, that Britain has drifted in this direction, rather than because this necessarily reflects the politicians' assessments of the principles involved.

Dutch Police Don't Know How to Delete Intercepted Calls

2009-10-28T11:41:00.001Z

From Slashdot:

"The law in the Netherlands says that intercepted phone calls between attorneys and their clients must be destroyed. But the Dutch government has been keeping under wraps for years that no one has the foggiest clue how to delete them (Google translation). Now, an email (PDF) from the National Police Services Agency (KLPD) has surfaced, revealing that the working of the technology in question is a NetApp trade secret. The Dutch police are now trying to get their Israeli supplier Verint to tell them how to delete tapped calls and comply with the law. Meanwhile, attorneys in the Netherlands remain afraid to use their phones."

News: New Kind of Body Scanner Researched

2009-10-28T10:52:00.000Z

From CNN: Homeland Security in the US is funding research for a new kind of body scanner. Named 'Future Attribute Screening Technology', or FAST, instead of directly detecting criminal activity the scanners which would measure 'natural signals from the body' - things like heart rate, breathing, body temperature and fidgeting - to determine whether the subject was suspiciously nervous, say. The project has come in for some criticism:

Civil liberties groups maintain this screening technology is an invasion of privacy.
"Nobody has the right to look at my intimate bodily functions, my breathing, my perspiration rate, my heart rate, from afar," said Joe Stanley of the ACLU.

How to Use Surveillance

2009-10-28T10:41:00.003Z

Via privacydigest.com - there's an interesting National Public Radio story on the investigation that has led to terrorism charges against Najibullah Zazi, a Denver area shuttle bus driver. It's being claimed that this is a textbook case for showing how surveillance techniques are used in successful cases:

Officials say FBI agents in Denver and New York had been tracking Zazi for some time — and experts analyzing the case say the way law enforcement gathered evidence against Zazi and possible co-conspirators may be a textbook case of how to conduct a terrorism investigation. The FBI used a blend of wiretaps and subpoenas, search warrants and local police, among other things, to build its case.
"I think what's striking about the Zazi case is not so much that new tools were being used, but that old tools were being used in a comprehensive fashion," says Sam Rascoff, who used to work terrorism cases for the New York Police Department's intelligence unit. "And that they were being stitched together in a thoughtful, strategic way, so that one tool naturally gave way to another."

News: More on facial recognition technology

2009-10-19T15:07:00.004+01:00

According to a report from USA Today, the FBI has begun trials of facial recognition technology in North Carolina. Reportedly, the trials helped to identify a suspect to a double homicide who had seemingly relocated to North Carolina from California and assumed a false name. FBI officers took a photo from the suspect’s California driver’s license and ran it against the photos contained in North Carolina’s Department of Motor Vehicles database. From “dozens” of potential matches, an FBI investigator zeroed in on one particular individual. That individual has now been placed under arrest. Marc Rotenberg of EPIC, however, questioned how effective the use of such technologies will be in counter-terrorist efforts since good photos of terrorists will rarely be available in DMV databases or elsewhere.

Comment: 'Naked' Scanners on Trial

2009-10-14T15:41:00.006+01:00

There's a good post at SpyBlog on the news of Manchester Airport's trial of Rapiscan's 'Naked' Body Scanners. The post makes a number of claims:

There's no 'safe' amount of ionising radiation.
The fact that the 'viewer' is hidden in another room, a measure designed to make the process less invasive, raises some new problems. If you can't see them, for one thing there's no way the public can know whether they're being 'examined' by a man or a woman: for some people that is going to be a big deal, and may be particularly problematic for certain cultural or religious minorities.
Defenders say no copies can be made of the 'naked' images (this has been repeated in a series of articles that have then illustrated the story with a digital camera screen grab). The system runs on a computer, so it seems inescapable that anyone with maintenance access has access to the images. Also, if the viewers are going to be in a separate room, how are they going to be prevented from taking pictures with a camera or mobile phone? Further surveillance, perhaps with CCTV cameras? I think setting up a system which is sufficiently thorough to rule out this sort of abuse without itself transmitting a further copy of the scanned passenger's picture is going to be difficult.
The use of these machines on children may actually be a violation of the 'draconian, inflexible and often bureaucratically misinterpreted Protection of Children Act 1978'. I don't know whether this interpretation of the law is correct (the wikipedia article linked to lists 'prevention, detection or investigation of crime' as a legitimate defence). Regardless, it is striking that the law should be so intensely relaxed about children's naked bodies being on display as soon as the word 'security' is mentioned.

News: 'Naked' Scanners Now on Trial at UK Airport

2009-10-14T15:21:00.004+01:00

From BBC news: Rapiscan Body Scanners are under trial at Manchester Airport. The scanners reveal clear images of any concealed weapons or explosives. However they also reveal clear images of the naked body - and any surgery, piercings or disabilities the person being scanned might have.

Manchester Airport have defended the trial, pointing out that the images are viewed in a different room from where the scanning takes place, breaking the link between the 'naked picture' and the person in question. They also point out that that pictures will not be stored.

Sarah Barrett, head of customer experience at the airport, said most passengers did not like the traditional "pat down" search.
At Manchester Airport's Terminal 2, where the machine has been introduced, passengers will no longer have to remove their coats, shoes and belts as they go through security checks.
Ms Barrett said: "This scanner completely takes away the hassle of needing to undress."

News: Targeted Billboard Ads Using DVLA Data

2009-10-12T10:31:00.004+01:00

From Spyblog: The Mail reports that Castrol, the motor oil company, has been conducting an innovative advertising campaign - they were using giant billboards to display targeted messages directing a particular vehicle to use specified fuel. A typical message you can see in the article reads ' 1 DF L The right oil for your car is: Castrol Magnatec 5W-30 A1'.

The campaign was making novel use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology, but the big question is how Castrol has come by the data about the drivers held by Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. The DVLA sells the data it holds on 34,000,000 drivers to a number of organisations. The article reports that sources admit that in this case the data was passed on from one of these to a third-party contractor who then themselves sold it in contravention of the ban on using registration numbers for marketing purposes:

Liberal Democrat transport spokesman Norman Baker said: ‘This completely inappropriate and unacceptable behaviour by the DVLA shows how cavalier it is with motorists’ information.
‘They don’t even check what the end use is. It seems all you have to do is ask and the DVLA will give, no matter who you are and for what purpose. It’s outrageous this was allowed to happen.’
The row is a fresh embarrassment for the DVLA and raises new questions about how highly sensitive drivers’ information is handled by the agency.
The Mail on Sunday has previously revealed that the agency was selling motorists’ names and home addresses to convicted criminals. In the past five years the DVLA has earned £15million from selling the names and addresses of more than six million motorists.

Comment: Lies and Faces

2009-10-07T15:52:00.006+01:00

The ABA Journal has published an interesting article on ongoing efforts to develop a better lie detector. Particular focus is placed on the use of various technologies such as EEGs and MRI to obtain a picture of brain activity. But the article also discusses the use of technology to examine eye movement and detect minute changes in facial expression. A number of critics have questioned the reliability of such methods. Given that the article appears in a publication of a lawyers’ professional association, it is not surprising that it places particular emphasis on the potential use of these technologies to develop evidence to be used in criminal prosecution. But, are there other ways that these methods might be implemented in the counter-terrorist context? Many of us have been put through little interview sessions at the airport during “heightened threat levels” before being permitted to board a flight. The idea behind these interviews being that the observation of our behavior when answering these questions as well as the actual content of the answers themselves might give us away if we have anything sinister planned. Immigration officials also generally ask us some questions before allowing us to enter a different country – although these interviews have a broader purpose than merely trying to ferret out terrorists. Might some government decide these interviews could be made more effective if we were having our brain activity, eye or facial movements scanned while they were being carried out?

On the subject of facial recognition technology, this area seems to be getting more and more attention, particularly in the security sector. There’s been a project at the University of Zurich which examined facial expression and emotion as well as their relevance for facial recognition technology. In order to be effective, this kind of technology will have to match faces that change in all manner of ways in the course of everyday human activity to static ID-photos that have been recorded in a database.

There’s also been a thread of research that has aimed at developing technology that can detect "abnormal behavior" or emerging dangerous situations - see for instance John's earlier post on INDECT. I can see how these two threads could merge where facial recognition technology would be used not only for identification but also in threat detection: i.e., the attribution of certain emotions to facial images could be used to determine whether dangerous or abnormal behavior is present.

News: Zurich Police Regulations Regarding Surveillance Ruled Unconstitutional

2009-10-01T11:24:00.003+01:00

The Swiss Federal Court has ruled that certain amendments to Zurich cantonal police regulations that pertain to surveillance are unconstitutional. According to a story in the Neuer Zürcher Zeitung, provisions concerning both the scope of surveillance and the duration for which surveillance footage might be preserved were among those which the court deemed to be in violation of constitutional protections. The court found that the amendments would permit both plain and covert surveillance throughout all public spaces within the Canton and that this lack of constraint represented an impermissible encroachment upon the freedom and private sphere of citizens. Another provision would have permitted film footage from surveillance activities to be preserved for up to a year or until related investigations had been concluded. According to the NZZ, the court held that the maximum period for preservation of such records is 100 days, thus demonstrating agreement with a decision which had been reached two years earlier in a case from the Canton of St. Gallen.

News: Swiss Federal Roads Office considers introducing GPS surveillance for speeders

2009-09-28T13:09:00.004+01:00

According to an article in Dem Bund, the Federal Roads Office has supported a suggestion to force known speeders to have a GPS device installed in their cars that would allow federal authorities to identify if the driver violates speed limits. The measure would be a condition for the reinstatement of a driver's license which had previously been revoked for excessive speeding.

Update: Border Laptop Searches

2009-09-25T10:21:00.002+01:00

From Privacy.org I previously reported on searches of laptops at US borders, now the Department of Homeland Security have published a Privacy Impact assessment declaring that laptops are equivalent to briefcases and backpacks and that it has authority to seize the devices and copy stored data whether or not wrongdoing is suspected.

News: Programme Can Reveal the Sexual Orientation of Social Network Users

2009-09-25T09:59:00.003+01:00

From Privacy.org: 2 students at MIT have developed a program, nicknamed project Gaydar, which will predict sexual orientation on the basis of who the individual 'friends' on social networking sites:

“Even if you don’t affirmatively post revealing information, simply publishing your friends’ list may reveal sensitive information about you, or it may lead people to make assumptions about you that are incorrect,” said Kevin Bankston, senior staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit digital rights organization in San Francisco. “Certainly if most or many of your friends are of a particular religious or political or sexual category, others may conclude you are part of the same category - even if you haven’t said so yourself.”

News: UK Environment Agency's use of RIPA Slammed

2009-09-24T15:46:00.005+01:00

The Daily Telegraph reports that government officials investigating 'illegal disposal of waste' improperly tracked cars and trespassed on private property under home office advice. The Office of Surveillance Commissioners found evidence of the breeches last year, but the tactics continued to be used until the Environment Agency recently announced a suspension of their use 'pending a legal judgement':

Reports from recent inspections show that “fundamental flaws” were discovered in some of its operations. The surveillance commissioner has also repeatedly raised concerns over the proportionality of the Environment Agency’s operations.
The reports – marked “restricted” - show that in 2007 the Home Office advised officials that “affixing a magnetic device to a vehicle on the public highway” was “not a criminal offence” and “putting an arm into a wheel arch or under the frame of a vehicle is straining the concept of trespass.”

The Environment Agency continues to trial a network of informants and intends to contruct 'a national spy network' the Commissioner reported.

EU Funding New Database to be used to Identify 'Abnormal Behaviour'

2009-09-24T14:51:00.006+01:00

From the Daily Telegraph: the EU is funding a 5 year project entitled INDECT (Intelligent information system supporting observation, searching and detection for security of citizens in urban environment) which aims 'to develop computer programmes which act as "agents" to monitor and process information from web sites, discussion forums, file servers, peer-to-peer networks and even individual computers' in order to identify so called 'abnormal' behaviour.

A number of interest groups have criticised the program:

Stephen Booth, an Open Europe analyst who has helped compile a dossier on the
European justice agenda, said these developments and projects such as Indect
sounded "Orwellian" and raised serious questions about individual liberty.
"This is all pretty scary stuff in my book. These projects would involve a huge invasion of privacy and citizens need to ask themselves whether the EU should be spending their taxes on them," he said. "The EU lacks sufficient checks and balances and there is no evidence that anyone has ever asked 'is this actually in the best interests of our citizens?'"
[Liberty's Shami Chakrabarti commented] "Profiling whole populations instead of monitoring individual suspects is a sinister step in any society. "It's dangerous enough at national level, but on a Europe-wide scale the idea becomes positively
chilling."

News: EP Resolution on US SWIFT Access

2009-09-24T14:40:00.005+01:00

From EDRI: I previously reported the concerns about the US access to European banking data. Now the European Parliament have passed a resolution insisting on the need for a new agreement:

The EP believes that the transfer requests should be "based on specific, targeted cases, limited in time and subject to judicial authorisation, and that any subsequent processing is limited to data which disclose a link with persons or organisations under examination in the US" and that "EU citizens and enterprises are granted the same defence rights and procedural guarantees and the same right of access to justice as exist in the EU and that the legality and proportionality of the transfer requests are open to judicial review in the US". In order to prevent any abuse, the transferred data should be "subject to the same judicial redress mechanisms as would apply to data held within the EU, including compensation in the event of unlawful processing of personal data." The resolution also asks for a reciprocity mechanism that would oblige the US authorities to equally transfer relevant financial data to the competent EU authorities, upon request.

News: UK ID Card Design and New ID Commissioner Unveiled

2009-09-24T12:36:00.004+01:00

We can now see what UK ID cards will look like. There is an interesting post at Spy Blog asking some important questions:

Will the ID Card number be randomly allocated, or will it betray information about the ID Card controllee, through batch sequences, which can also help to break the cryptographic protections on the Contactless / RFID chip, just as happened with the Netherlands biometric passport ?

The post at Spy Blog also criticises the limitations of the powers of the new ID Commissioner, Sir Joseph Pilling:

The National Identity Scheme Commissioner is specifically forbidden by the
terms of reference which appoint him under the Identity Cards Act 2006 section 22 Appointment of National Identity Scheme Commissioner to look into the following activities, which are exactly the secret activities which are the most likely to abuse the National Identity Register, and which therefore should be scrutinised the most:

(4) The matters to be kept under review by the Commissioner do not
include--
(a) the exercise of powers which under this Act are exercisable by
statutory instrument or by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory
Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12));
(b) appeals against civil penalties;
(c) the operation of so much of this Act or of any
subordinate legislation as imposes or relates to criminal offences;
(d) the provision of information to the Director-General of the Security Service, the
Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service or the Director of the Government Communications Headquarters;
(e) the provision to another member of the
intelligence services, in accordance with regulations under section 21(5), of
information that may be provided to that Director-General, Chief or Director;
(f) the exercise by the Secretary of State of his powers under
section 38; or
(g) arrangements made for the purposes of anything mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (f).

News: Insurers Offering Discounts to Put Cameras in Cars

2009-09-24T12:10:00.003+01:00

From Slashdot: A car insurer is offering discounts to teen drivers who participate in the Teen Safe Driver scheme, whereby a camera is fixed under the rear view mirror. The recordings are sent to a third party analysis sender who then provide parents with footage and an assessment of the safety of the driving. Teen Safe maintain the footage would never be shared with insurers.

News: Newly Obtained Declassified Documents Reveal More Details about FBI's NSAC

2009-09-24T10:46:00.003+01:00

Wired has run a story on the FBI’s National Security Branch Analysis Center (NSAC) based on newly obtained declassified documents. The Center makes use of a database system that includes “tens of thousands of records from private corporate databases, including car-rental companies, large hotel chains and at least one national department store.” The author of the article speculates that a number of businesses may be voluntarily providing records on specifically named individuals at the FBI’s request – as was the case with JetBlue and passenger records. The database system is being used both for counter-terrorist efforts as well as other criminal investigations. Among the things the system currently contains according to Wired:

• International travel records of citizens and foreigners

• Financial forms filed with the Treasury by banks and casinos

• 55,000 entries on customers of Wyndham Worldwide, which includes Ramada Inn, Days Inn, Super 8, Howard Johnson and Hawthorn Suites

• 730 records from rental-car company Avis

• 165 credit card transaction histories from Sears

• Nearly 200 million records transferred from private data brokers such Accurint, Acxiom and Choicepoint

• A reverse White Pages with 696 million names and addresses tied to U.S. phone numbers

• Log data on all calls made by federal prison inmates

• A list of all active pilots

• 500,000 names of suspected terrorists from the Unified Terrorist Watch List

• Nearly 3 million records on people cleared to drive hazardous materials on the nation’s highways

• Telephone records and wiretapped conversations captured by FBI investigations

• 17,000 traveler itineraries from the Airlines Reporting Corporation

Wired reports that the database system is being used in conjunction with a meta-search engine and link and pattern analysis software.