Is Anybody Watching?

Although Britain may boast a denser concentration of CCTV cameras than any other in the world, most forces "do not have systems to retrive, process and distribute CCTV crime scene images" according to a senior officer speaking to BBC news. The officer goes on to say that too much money has been spent on kit, while not enough money has been spent training operators or putting effective structures in place.

The widespread use of CCTV has been criticised a great deal by privacy advocates. How would an awareness that the technology is being used very ineffectively impact on these assessments? Should someone worried about the Big Brother state be cheered or saddened by this news?

Does it just make it even worse, because the promised benefits of intrusions are not being delivered on? Or is there any sense to the claim that, if nobody is watching the footage that CCTV is recording, then there can't be an invasion of privacy occuring? Or can surveillance be intrusive just by virtue of the possibility that someone could be watching?

So Who's in the Office Next to Your's?

Slashdot reports that researchers at the University of Lausanne have worked out how to log keystrokes without installing any software on the machine whatsoever, simply by making use of the electromagnetic waves given off.

The techniques are effective to a range of 20 metres - even if there's a wall in the way - which is more than sufficient to use this for the most intrusive covert surveillance.

Big Brother is Watching your Status Updates

From Slashdot: apparantly police saw a facebook message inviting 15 guests to an 'all night party', and in response preemptively shut it down as a potential 'illegal rave' using four police cars, a riot van and a police helicopter in the process. Reports on Slashdot and The Register.

Should the police be monitoring what people say on social networking sites? As I've noted before, there is a large measure of ambiguity over whether the exchanges that happen on such sites count as public or private. Should there be any restriction of this monitoring? Legally, should it be treated like an overheard conversation in the street, or like private correspondence by mail?

At the end of the day, most accept the legitimacy of police surveillance under some conditions at least, but when should they act on the basis of evidence gathered in this way? Should it only be used to prevent certain sorts of crimes? Or is anything illegal fair game?

France Plans Development of Database for Threatening Personalities

Last year, the French government expressed the intention to create a new law enforcement database dubbed EDVIGE (exploitation documentaire et valorisation de l’information générale). The purpose was to have a profile of every individual from the age of thirteen on up as well as groups and organizations which “on the basis of their individual or collective activities represent a potential threat to the public order.” Allegedly, anyone who had a direct relationship with these individuals, groups, or organizations would also go into the database. Access to the database would be available to the French intelligence service and the police.

Public outcry against these plans resulted in revisions to the proposed enabling legislation behind the database and ultimately the withdrawal of the legislation in December 2008. Now a third version of the bill is on the table (“EDVIGE 3.0”). The latest bill, however, reportedly would still subject children of thirteen years and older to inclusion in the database, and complaints have been raised that definitions governing the scope of the database are too broad. A summary of the latest bill in French is available here. The Austrian media organization Unwatched.org also has an article on EDVIGE in German.

"Stockholm Programme" Discussed at EU Ministerial Meetings

Today marks the beginning of EU ministerial meetings taking place in Stockholm. A major item on the agenda is the so-called Stockholm Programme which will seek to establish a framework for cooperation among EU countries (and potentially non-EU countries as well) to deal with issues in crime and law enforcement, customs, and immigration. A number of organizations have expressed concern over the potentially far-reaching surveillance aspects that may be associated with the project. For more information, see this press release on the website of the Swedish presidency of the EU and this report from EDRI with related links.

Unclassified Report on Bush Surveillance Program Released

Last Friday, an unclassified version of a report drafted by the Inspectors General Offices of five US federal agencies was released to the public. Kurt Opsahl of the Electronic Frontier Foundation has written an entry about the report on EFF's DEEPLINKS Blog. Perhaps one of the most interesting lines that Opsahl pulls out of the report is an indication that "most officials in the intelligence community 'had difficulty citing specific instances where [the surveillance] had directly contributed to counterterrorism successes.'" That revelation is perhaps all the more disturbing in light of reports (see, e.g., this article from the New York Times (registration required)) that some of the surveillance activities under the program violated US law.

What Powers Should Airport Screeners Have?

The Wall Street Journal has published a story which asks whether the US agency that conducts security screenings at US airports, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), hasn’t begun overstepping its authority. The story discusses two recent US federal cases which have challenged the legality of searches and seizures conducted by the TSA. One case, before the district court for the Southern District of Ohio, concerned the seizure of three fake passports. That case has already been resolved with the finding that the seizure did not comport with the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. The second case is evidently still pending before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

In the Ohio case, Judge Algenon L. Marbley found that Congress has only authorized the TSA to search for weapons and explosives; therefore, when the TSA searches for other things, it goes beyond its mandate. Yet, according to the Journal’s story, TSA is “now training airport screeners to spot anything suspicious, and then honoring them when searches lead to arrests for crimes like drug possession and credit-card fraud.” This charge is reminiscent of reports that Federal Air Marshalls were expected to meet quotas in terms of the number of “Surveillance Detection Reports” they filed which were also tied to salary raises, awards, and bonuses (Note: The Air Marshalls are also under the authority of the TSA).

The story and court cases raise a number of significant questions in terms of air transportation policy: Should the individuals who conduct airport screenings have general police powers? Would it enhance the ability to ensure flight safety and counter terrorism? Is it necessary for these ends? The scope and limits on the powers of screeners is likely to vary from nation to nation. Does that fact present a problem for effective counter-terrorist efforts?

Incidentally, Chris Soghoion has dedicated a number of blog entries to the TSA and his experiences with them, including one incident that involved the interplay of TSA and local police authority. Chris has long pointed out that the maintenance of a no-fly list is of limited effectiveness so long as individuals are permitted to board domestic US flights without some form of identification (Note TSA spokesman Greg Soule’s discussion of identity in the Wall Street Journal article).