Admitting the necessarily speculative nature of the endevour, he discusses purely practical issues: the fact that only a small amount of explosive, for example is needed to cause the intended chaos and the fact that flights, as they involve both an origin and a destination, raise questions and fears in two countries at once. He goes on to make a vivid case for the symbolic value of successfully hitting 'the enemy' in exactly the spot where most effort and resources have been expended in the name of security:
My hunch is that a reason to target air travel is precisely because it is the area in which the west has concentrated its maximum overt security efforts after 9/11. Piercing the thick barriers of checks all passengers have to go through to board a plane is in itself a success. It amounts to defying the toughest challenge, freshening up memories of 9/11, showing that even a puny David, farcically armed with just a pair of explosive underpants, can hit Goliath right where he feels strongest.Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab failed to kill, but succeeded in making the west quake in its boots, engendering a hysterical worldwide security response, shaming the US security services, and inducing Obama to resurrect the dismal and counter-productive rhetoric of "we are at war against al-Qaida", which one hoped had departed with Bush. Had Abdulmutallab succeeded in killing, the global havoc caused would not have been that much greater. He could never have achieved that by aiming at softer targets.
I think there is always a danger in trying to infer to much about the intentions of actors from the effects of their actions, particularly in the case of violence. I do, however, think its interesting to reflect on governments' (and societies') reactions to terrorism and the calculus of risk - while countries targetted by terrorists have a necessarily limited ability to stop terrorism from happening its at least plausible to think they have more control over how they choose to respond to such events.
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