Detecter Deliverable: Unilateral Exceptions to International Law

Deliverable D06.1 was written by Mathias Vermeulen and Martin Scheinin as part of Work Package 04. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive Summary

This paper on unilateral exceptions to human rights and international law in the fight against terrorism prepares the ground for two further deliverables under the DETECTER project, namely a policy-oriented paper summarizing the results and applying them in respect of EU law and policies, and a study specifically addressing detection technologies. It is well known that many governments have resorted to a wide range of constructions to justify, under international law, their unilateral exceptions to human rights in the name of countering terrorism. This paper seeks to take stock of a whole range of arguments, doctrines or constructions that states may resort to when seeking to justify their unilateral exceptions to human rights norms in the fight against terrorism. Many of those constructions have a valid legal basis and a proper scope of application. However, they also have their limitations, to the effect that often they affect only a specific treaty, or the availability of a procedure, but do not affect the substantive obligations of the state in question under international law. In many cases this results from the overlap of treaty law and customary norms of international law. Some of the constructions are open to abuse, i.e. bad faith efforts to distort international law to the detriment of human rights. Because of the complexity of the combined effect of the various excuses and exceptions, there is a need for a holistic approach that seeks to address the combined effect of the various constructions of unilateral exception.

Some of the main conclusions of the paper are highlighted in this executive summary. To start with:

• None of the constructions discussed affects a state's obligations under peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens).
• Outside that realm of peremptory norms, some of the constructions discussed have an impact upon both treaty law and customary international law, hence affecting the substantive human rights obligations of a state. This would be the case for the lex specialis effect of international humanitarian law during armed conflict but only when lex specialis is properly construed as an interpretive effect upon the scope or content of a particular human right.
• Counter-terrorism measures may qualify as permissible limitations on human rights, again when properly construed. This conclusion calls for a rigorous test for permissible limitations, rather than an all-encompassing act of 'balancing'.
• Most constructions discussed in this paper pertain merely to human rights treaties and do not affect the state's obligations under customary international law. As there is a high degree of substantive overlap between human rights treaties and customary norms of international law, resorting to these excuses therefore usually only has procedural consequences. It does not affect the substantive obligations of the state under international law, but precludes the competence of an international (or regional) human rights court or treaty body to address the breach of international law through its regular monitoring mechanisms.
• The most relevant constructions of unilateral exceptions to human rights treaty obligations are the power of a state to declare a state of emergency and to derogate from some but not all of its human rights treaty obligations, reduction of the scope of a state's human rights obligations when it acts outside its own territory, the right to enter permissible reservations upon the signature or ratification of a treaty and, in some cases, withdrawal from a treaty.
• There is some state practice of declaring a state of emergency because of acts of or a threat of terrorism. When applied under the fairly strict requirements for derogation enshrined in the treaties in question and when subject to international monitoring through the procedures available under the treaties in question, derogation is a permissible and even recommended mechanism for reacting to situations of a genuine threat to the life of the nation.
• Although the European Court of Human Rights has in some cases implied that a state is not subject to exactly the same obligations when it is, through its agents, acting outside its own territory, caution is required when resorting to this excuse. Other human rights treaties and customary norms of human rights law may remain applicable, and even the position of the European Court of Human Rights appears to be shifting (or inconsistent).
• Somewhat surprisingly, states have not resorted to reservations under human rights treaties with express reference to terrorism. However, a very small number of existing reservations, including in respect of the right to a fair trial, may have a bearing upon the treatment of terrorism suspects.
• Some, primarily regional, human rights treaties would allow for a state's unilateral withdrawal from the treaty. In practice, the option of withdrawal has figured in the political discourse, for instance after a government has received a ruling by a regional human rights court but no state has actually resorted to withdrawal from human rights treaties as a response to terrorism.