Detecter Deliverable: Border Control and Internal Security in the European Union

Deliverable D14.1 was written by Audelina Ahumada as part of Work Package 05. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive summary

1. Since the New York terrorist attacks in September 2001, border control is increasingly shaped by security considerations. This paper concentrates on the implications of this trend for the enjoyment of human rights protection by third-country nationals that seek to enter or have already gained access to European Union territory. The integration in the common border policy of threat assessments and risk analyses together with information gathering and sharing through the use of advanced technology has contributed to the perception that cross-border movements, and, in particular (potential)irregular immigration are closely related to serious criminality, including terrorism.
2. In the development of a common border policy, the EU, together with its Member States, should ensure that control and surveillance over the external frontiers are implemented in full compliance with legally binding international and European human rights standards. This should include operations aimed at diverting “illegal immigration” when conducted beyond EU external borders and when carried out in cooperation with third countries.
3. The legal mandate of the EU Border Control Agency, Frontex, should be clearly defined, in particular as regards the Agency’s competencies and corresponding responsibilities. Any coordination of or other involvement in border control operations by Frontex should be governed by clear guidelines which ensure respect for the principle of non-refoulement, including chain-refoulement, and the right to a fair and effective asylum procedure for any person claiming an international protection need.
4. The integration of internal security aspects in EU border policy also affects the processing of personal data on third-country nationals. Such data are stored in centralised EU-operated databases and were originally collected for primarily immigration-related purposes. Promotion of access to sensitive personal immigration data, including fingerprints, by law enforcement authorities for purposes including the prevention of and fight against terrorism implies that non-EU citizens form a suspect category in itself. This raises serious questions concerning the legitimacy, including necessity and proportionality of the measure under data protection principles inherent in the right to privacy. It may, in addition, have serious implications for the principle of non-discrimination.
5. Trends towards “interoperability” between EU-operated databases should be accompanied by the establishment of a comprehensive, specific and legally binding data protection framework with adequate safeguards to cover risks related to the large scale storage and use of personal data. The more authorities have access to sensitive personal information, the greater the risks of abuse, misuse, leaks and loss of data. This may have serious consequences, including with regard to the prohibition of torture and the principle of non-refoulement, if data on refugees and asylum-seekers reach authorities in their countries of origin.
6. Applying systematically EU carrier sanctions regime on international carriers may obstruct refugees and asylum-seekers in seeking protection in the EU. Trends toward the extension of the carrier sanctions regime to include the transfer of passenger data to national authorities, including for counter-terrorism purposes, raise serious questions from the perspective of data protection principles. Refugee protection is further marginalilzed, while adding to the perception that cross-border movements are closely linked with criminality.
   

Detecter Deliverable: Unilateral Exceptions to International Law

Deliverable D06.1 was written by Mathias Vermeulen and Martin Scheinin as part of Work Package 04. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive Summary

This paper on unilateral exceptions to human rights and international law in the fight against terrorism prepares the ground for two further deliverables under the DETECTER project, namely a policy-oriented paper summarizing the results and applying them in respect of EU law and policies, and a study specifically addressing detection technologies. It is well known that many governments have resorted to a wide range of constructions to justify, under international law, their unilateral exceptions to human rights in the name of countering terrorism. This paper seeks to take stock of a whole range of arguments, doctrines or constructions that states may resort to when seeking to justify their unilateral exceptions to human rights norms in the fight against terrorism. Many of those constructions have a valid legal basis and a proper scope of application. However, they also have their limitations, to the effect that often they affect only a specific treaty, or the availability of a procedure, but do not affect the substantive obligations of the state in question under international law. In many cases this results from the overlap of treaty law and customary norms of international law. Some of the constructions are open to abuse, i.e. bad faith efforts to distort international law to the detriment of human rights. Because of the complexity of the combined effect of the various excuses and exceptions, there is a need for a holistic approach that seeks to address the combined effect of the various constructions of unilateral exception.

Some of the main conclusions of the paper are highlighted in this executive summary. To start with:

• None of the constructions discussed affects a state's obligations under peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens).
• Outside that realm of peremptory norms, some of the constructions discussed have an impact upon both treaty law and customary international law, hence affecting the substantive human rights obligations of a state. This would be the case for the lex specialis effect of international humanitarian law during armed conflict but only when lex specialis is properly construed as an interpretive effect upon the scope or content of a particular human right.
• Counter-terrorism measures may qualify as permissible limitations on human rights, again when properly construed. This conclusion calls for a rigorous test for permissible limitations, rather than an all-encompassing act of 'balancing'.
• Most constructions discussed in this paper pertain merely to human rights treaties and do not affect the state's obligations under customary international law. As there is a high degree of substantive overlap between human rights treaties and customary norms of international law, resorting to these excuses therefore usually only has procedural consequences. It does not affect the substantive obligations of the state under international law, but precludes the competence of an international (or regional) human rights court or treaty body to address the breach of international law through its regular monitoring mechanisms.
• The most relevant constructions of unilateral exceptions to human rights treaty obligations are the power of a state to declare a state of emergency and to derogate from some but not all of its human rights treaty obligations, reduction of the scope of a state's human rights obligations when it acts outside its own territory, the right to enter permissible reservations upon the signature or ratification of a treaty and, in some cases, withdrawal from a treaty.
• There is some state practice of declaring a state of emergency because of acts of or a threat of terrorism. When applied under the fairly strict requirements for derogation enshrined in the treaties in question and when subject to international monitoring through the procedures available under the treaties in question, derogation is a permissible and even recommended mechanism for reacting to situations of a genuine threat to the life of the nation.
• Although the European Court of Human Rights has in some cases implied that a state is not subject to exactly the same obligations when it is, through its agents, acting outside its own territory, caution is required when resorting to this excuse. Other human rights treaties and customary norms of human rights law may remain applicable, and even the position of the European Court of Human Rights appears to be shifting (or inconsistent).
• Somewhat surprisingly, states have not resorted to reservations under human rights treaties with express reference to terrorism. However, a very small number of existing reservations, including in respect of the right to a fair trial, may have a bearing upon the treatment of terrorism suspects.
• Some, primarily regional, human rights treaties would allow for a state's unilateral withdrawal from the treaty. In practice, the option of withdrawal has figured in the political discourse, for instance after a government has received a ruling by a regional human rights court but no state has actually resorted to withdrawal from human rights treaties as a response to terrorism.

Detecter Deliverable: Privacy, Secret Detention Centres and Overflights

Deliverable 16.1 was written by Geir Ulfstein as part of Work Package 08. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive Summary

1. Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) establishes the right to privacy. The implementation of this right is monitored by the Human Rights Committee. The Committee has emphasized that interference in the right to privacy must be foreseeable; mechanisms should be established to prevent abuse of collected information and to ensure review, supervision and redress; and vulnerable groups should be protected. The Committee has, however, not established clear guidance about which substantive measures would be considered a violation of the right of privacy.
2. News media and NGOs reported in 2005 about secret detention centres and overflights in Europe as part of US counter-terrorism strategy. Such activities gave rise to several human rights concerns. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe initiated an inquiry into these matters. The Secretary General requested member states to provide relevant information. The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) prepared an opinion on the human rights aspects. Cooperation was also established with the European Parliament of the European Union. This cooperation uncovered suspicious patterns of military and civilian aircraft and indications of secret detention centres. They were also able to put political pressure on the respective international organs and on national governments. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, however, failed to follow up strongly, and the European Parliament deplored the lack of follow up by the Council of the European Union, and by member states.
3. Several UN organs have been involved in the issues of secret detention and overflights, including the Human Rights Committee, the Committee Against Torture, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. The UN organs have generally been more reactive than what was the case of the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly. But all the bodies have, within their mandates, addressed these matters. They have helped to uncover certain facts, but have not been able to establish ‘hard facts’ about the relevant activities. These bodies have, however, the benefit of being able to have a more continuous focus on such cases. Furthermore, they have a global focus, and may thus engage in activities beyond the European context.

DETECTER: Survey of Counter-Terrorism Datamining and Related Programmes

D08.1 was written by Daniel Moeckli and James Thurman as part of Work Package 6. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive Summary

1. The survey reflects a broad definition of data mining and also includes coverage of related programmes relating to data collection and database construction.
2. In the West, collection activities have increased dramatically in the name of countering terrorism. In addition to data collection involving air passengers, this survey also describes general law enforcement collection activities as well as those specifically targeting terrorist activity.
3. Air passenger information: in the United States, data mining in this area was proposed in order to identify terrorist suspects who might not otherwise raise suspicions. In the European Union, too, there seems to be interest in analyzing a passenger’s travel activities in order to identify suspicious patterns which might indicate criminal activity.
4. Private companies and non-law enforcement databases: in the US there has been concern about the incorporation of data from these sources into general law enforcement data bases.
5. Data analysis programmes that have been proposed and in some cases implemented for counter-terrorism purposes are also considered. These include not only data mining programmes but also a discernable trend of providing tools which guide users in their analysis and decision-making.

DETECTER: The Human Rights Risks of Selected Detection Technologies

DETECTER Deliverable 17.1 was written by Rozemarijn van der Hilst as part of Work Package 9. You can read the whole thing here:

Executive Summary

1. Intelligence is a vital element in successful counter-terrorism. There is rapid development in detection technologies that aid in the gathering of information. However, there are concerns over the privacy intrusion these detection technologies cause.
2. Privacy is important for individual well-being, as well as the proper functioning of a democratic society. The right to privacy is vested in different national, European and International laws, which prescribe that the right to privacy may only be limited by measures that have a sound legal basis and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of national security.
3. From the legal and moral framework around privacy it emerges that detection technologies used in counter-terrorism should take account of: legitimacy, proportionality, necessity, transparency, factors concerning the person targeted, the sensitivity of the data sought, the effectiveness, the possibility of function creep and the extent to which PET’s are implemented.
4. Privacy concerns arise with the widespread and indiscriminate use of communication surveillance; the covert use of CCTV technology; the sensitivity of biometric data; and the ineffectiveness (and therefore disproportionateness) of data mining and analysis and decision support technologies.
5. There are also risks inherent to the use of detection technologies in general. The use of detection technologies can have a ‘chilling effect’ and can be ineffective due to the huge amount of gathered data. However, positive effects of the use of detection technologies are the ability to detect and therefore prevent terrorist attacks and the deterrent effect they have.
6. Detection technologies should be used, provided that their authorization is based on legislation that protects against abuse and presents fair consideration to the proportionality and necessity of the aim pursued. The ultimate assessment of the threat detection technologies pose to privacy depends on the actual usage of the technologies.

DETECTER: The Moral Risks of Preventive Policing in Counter-terrorism

I'm going to start listing details of publications of the DETECTER project here on the blog. D05.1 has been written by Tom Sorell as part of Work Package 3. You can read the whole thing here.

Executive Summary

1. Preventive policing is any action carried out by police with the intention of identifying and preventing a specific crime or a type of crime. Preventive policing can include “special investigation techniques”, including secret surveillance. These carry obvious moral risks.

2. Recommendaton Rec (2005) 10 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe outlines possible restrictions on the use of special investigation techniques. It suggests that the least intrusive special investigation measures should be used, if at all, only when the prevention or prosecution of serious crime requires it, and not in a way that conflicts with the right of anyone arrested to a fair trial. The principles reflect legal privacy protections under European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, and Convention 108.

3. Liberal theory supports the approach of Rec (2005) 10. It permits the use of special investigative techniques in preventive policing if the crime that these techniques are intended to prevent is very serious, e.g. a terrorist attack. In particular, liberal theory permits the use of secret surveillance, if the choice of targets for the surveillance is evidence-based.

4. The form of liberal theory that best reconciles the demands of privacy and counterterrorism with those of liberty is a modified Kantian theory, which is less utopian in its assumptions about human beings than a Lockean theory, but which excludes the total concentration of power, as in a Hobbesian theory.

5. Liberal theory condemns terrorist acts not just because of the injury and death they cause, but because of the contempt for impartiality that terrorist groups display. Impartiality is central to the liberal design of government institutions.

6. Privacy in Kantian theory is primarily the scope agents have for deliberating and choosing life plans free from other people’s interference. In liberal theory generally, privacy is also the scope people have for forming intimate relationships without scrutiny and adopting harmless life plans (harmless means of pursuing happiness) without being subject to outside criticism.

7. Kantian theory does not justify restrictions on thought or expression of thought about terrorism or in favour of terrorism, but it does justify restrictions on actions that contribute to terrorist acts.

8. Expression of thought about terrorism, even expression of thought sympathetic to
terrorism, should not be criminalized from the point of view of liberal theory. This counts against e.g. the “glorification” of terrorism provisions in the UK Terrorism Act (2006).

9. Kantian theory implies that preventive policing can fairly employ “profiling” techniques for identifying suspects in counter-terrorism, so long as these are evidence-based.

10. “Profiling techniques” cannot justifiably be used alongside detention and trial procedures that are revised ad hoc for counter-terrorism purposes.