Increasing Controversy with Introduction of New Pat-Down Procedures for US Airline Travel

When the US deployed backscatter x-ray and millimeter wave scanners, travellers were given the choice to opt for a physical pat-down instead of going through the scanner. Now, the TSA has introduced new, more invasive pat-down procedures that involve exploring around breasts and genitals and between the buttocks (See for instance this particularly graphic account as well as this account reportedly from author Erin Chase). Some early reports speculated that the new measures were introduced in order to intimidate those who would otherwise choose the pat-down into deciding that maybe the scanners aren’t that bad. Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic has stated that TSA personnel explicitly admitted that that was the reason behind the new policy. John Pistole, Administrator of the TSA, who was called before the US Senate Commerce Committee this week, suggested that the new procedures are in response to covert testing of the old pat-down method which indicated it wasn’t “thorough” enough.

Meanwhile, concerns about the health effects of the scanners continue. Four scientists affiliated with the University of California at San Francisco drafted an open letter last spring to President Obama’s Assistant for Science and Technology outlining their concerns with the backscatter scanners. They argue that official assessments of the health impact from backscatter radiation may underestimate the potential effects of the low-levels of dosage that the scanners emit since they are based on whole body exposure, whereas the scanners would concentrate all radiation in the skin. Additionally, they express concern that certain groups or individuals may be particularly vulnerable to the increased radiation exposure, and they decry the failure to publish key data that would permit independent assessment of the health risks. Both the Allied Pilots Association and the US Airline Pilots Association have advised their members not to go through the scanners. The US Airline Pilots Association further notes that experiences with the new “enhanced” pat-down procedures have involved “a wide range of possibilities … and the results can be devastating.” Others have more general objections to both the scanner/ pat-down procedures. Two commercial pilots have even filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security citing Fourth Amendment violations. A number of State legislators in New Jersey have objected to the current screening regime and have introduced resolutions calling on the TSA to reconsider its procedures. Additionally, one private individual is calling for a national “opt-out” day to stage a protest.

Update: US Marshalls Service Incident

I noted in a post on Monday that the US Marshalls Service had revealed that it had stored more than 35,000 images from a Brijot Gen2 scanner that was in use at a Florida courthouse. The Marshalls Service has issued a statement in response to that disclosure. That statement is available on the Brijot website here.

A reader of my earlier post "Focus on Full Body Scanners" pointed out in a comment that the Brijot scanners are passive wave scanners--i.e. they don't emit radiation--and as the statement from the Marshalls Service indicates, the images produced don't represent clear images of the naked body (the statement includes a link to the Brijot website with a couple of examples).

Evidently, however, the scanner also took photographic images of the individuals passing through, and I'm curious as to whether the photos were among the images that were stored.

I think I would be happier with these kind of scanners in airports than the active wave scanners. Some UK airports have also been taking photographs of travellers as they pass through the airport. As long as the photos aren't generally retained for too long, say 24 - 48 hours, that might also be acceptable.

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: Document on Body Scanners

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights published a Q&A document on the use of full body scanners last month.

It addresses the following questions:

1. Which fundamental rights are at risk of being affected by the use of body scanners?

2. Is the use of a body scanner to be considered as processing personal data?

3. How could the requirements on the design and selection of body scanners best respect rules on data protection?

4. How can body scanners be assessed from a rule of law perspective?

5. Are there specific considerations to be taken into account when selecting people to be screened?

6. Should the person to be screened be given the choice between a body scanner and other screening methods?

7. Which information should be given to persons before they choose to be screened by a body scanner?

8. How intrusive are body scanners if compared to other screening methods?

9. Is the detection capability of body scanners an added value regarding security?

10. Which conditions should apply in order to address the concerns related to fundamental rights?

News: US Marshalls Service stored more than 35,000 images from full body scanners

In a letter responding to a Freedom of Information Request from the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the US Marshalls Service indicated that it had a file of approximately 35,314 images from a Brijot Gen2 scanner that were created between 2 Feb. 2010 and 28 July 2010. In this instance, the machine was not being used for airport security but rather was installed at the security checkpoint of a Florida courthouse. Additionally, the letter indicated that there may have been other images stored by a scanner being tested at a federal courthouse in the District of Columbia. That machine was returned to the manufacturer once testing had been completed and “any images that may have been stored on that machine are therefore no longer under agency control.” No copies of images from that machine were stored by the agency, the letter states.

News: Body Scanner Developments

EPIC points out that DHS announced last week it plans to roll out full body scanners (now known as “Advanced Imaging Technology” in TSA-speak) to 28 additional airports. Meanwhile, EPIC has attempted to bring an action to suspend use of the scanners, and a bill has been introduced in the US Senate (S.3536) that would require deployment of the scanners at all US airports by 2013.

In Switzerland, the Zurich Airport began a pilot test involving a single body scanner on 8 June 2010. The test involved the “second generation” system which uses the gingerbread-man-like display rather than an actual scan image. The pilot test was completed on 14 July 2010, and the Airport states that the use of the system enjoyed a high acceptance rate among passengers. The results from the test are being assessed, and future tests may take place, but there are currently no plans to acquire any scanners, the Airport reports.

Israeli Security Expert Decries Body Scanners Before Canadian Parliament

The Vancouver Sun has reported that an Israeli security expert who assisted in the design of the security system at Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion International Airport suggested in parliamentary hearings that the deployment of body scanners is a “useless” waste of money.

“I don't know why everybody is running to buy these expensive and useless machines. I can overcome the body scanners with enough explosives to bring down a Boeing 747,” he is quoted as saying, “That's why we haven't put them in our airport.”

According to the story, a Canadian transport minister has defended the installation of body scanners at Canadian airports. Political scientist Mark Salter also reportedly testified that he viewed body scanners as a “genuine leap forward” in airline security. (Hat tip to unwatched.org)

News: Airport Worker Disciplined for Abuse of Full Body Scanner

From the Guardian: police gave a warning for harassment against a 25 year old man for taking a photo of a female co-worker as she inadvertantly walked through a full body scanner. Tabloid newspaper the Sun reports that he 'ogled her' and made 'lewd' comments.

BAA said: "We treat any allegations of inappropriate behaviour or misuse of security equipment very seriously and these claims are being investigated thoroughly," a BAA spokesman said. "If found to be substantiated we will take appropriate action."

News: US Government Accountability Office on the Cost of Full Body Scanners

Via Privacy.org: The Government Accountability Office , the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of the US Congress, has estimated that rolling out full body scanners worldwide will cost the American taxpayer about $3,000,000,000:

The audit agency said TSA estimates each unit costs about $170,000, meaning it would cost about $300 million to buy 1,800 units, enough to cover about 60 percent of screening checkpoint lanes at the highest-priority commercial airports. Each scanner requires three people to operate. Based on the administration's request for $219 million to hire 3,550 TSA staffers next year alone, GAO estimates it will cost $2.4 billion overall to staff the machines over eight years.

They also have raised the issue of effectiveness, noting in particular that the operation of such machines on the 25 of December would not have stopped Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. The House Homeland Security Committee is due to have a hearing on the proposed use of the machines this afternoon.

Detecter partner Mathias Vermeulen has a piece summarising the growing opposition to full body scanners over at the Lift.

DETECTER on BBC Midlands Today

Millimetre Wave Scanners and Mastectomies

There's an interesting discussion piece on politicsdaily.com by a woman who whose breast surgery confused TSA officials following a 'full body scan' prompting further examination.

She is not upset about her experience, concluding simply that 'the takeaway here is, if you have fake body parts, you should be prepared to explain them to the full-body screening folks at the TSA.' However, a number of comments left underneath her article report terrible experiences of insensitive, and wholly avoidable treatment. A selection:

"Wow, I thought I was the only one. TSA in Tampa held me on display for about 20 minutes while they tried to figure out was was on my chest. I was put through the full body scanner also sans shoes. After I was finished, I was told "DO NOT MOVE!" "Ok, but can I please have my sandals, they have already been scanned?" 'DO NOT MOVE." I suppose they were busy, scanning another woman's BARE FEET." Ok, they were having communication problems with the guys in the little room. I figured they were laughing so hard at the scan they could not respond. I am a 66 year old grandmother, the scan had to be really exciting. After 20 minutes the "gentleman" returned and announced to all who were within a 100 foot radius, "There is something on her left breast." They must be fixated on left breasts. At that point I realized they were talking about my breast prothesis. I am a breast cancer survivor. I explained this and was told "DO NOT MOVE!" At this time, the TSA moron told another that she would have to pat me down. No, would you please step into a private area, just pat her down. I offer to whip it out. He was not happy with that idea. I understand security, but please, a little consideration. Would they stop a man with a penal implant? Doubtful. After all, this was a bomb of a boob."

"Okay, I have to comment. I had the same problem. When they did a biopsy to diagnose my breast cancer, they inserted a few metal clips to mark the place of the tumor. Because I went out of state for my mastectomy and reconstruction, I had to fly. And I had the same thing happen. Stopped at security for setting off a metal detector (this was before the full body scans) and then "searched" with the wand right there in the airport, in front of everyone...and she kept waving it over my left breast (yeah - my left, too) and saying, "It's something here." I kept telling them it was probably the surgical clip. I finally had to take out my mammograms (I'd brought the films for my surgeon, and thankfully, they were in my carry-on) and show them it was just a clip. It helped that my neighbor, who works for TSA, showed up about then and told them he knew me."

News: UK Introducing Compulsory Body Scans

From BBC News: Under new security rules passengers selected for screening by the Millimetre Wave 'Naked Body Scanners' will be forced to consent to the scanning on pain of not being allowed on the flight. The machines are in place at Heathrow and Manchester airport and will be installed at Birmingham airport later this month:

Transport Secretary Lord Adonis said in the immediate future only a small proportion of airline passengers would be selected for scanning.

In a written statement to the House of Commons, he said: "If a passenger is selected for scanning, and declines, they will not be permitted to fly."

News: Florence DETECTER Programme Announced

The second DETECTER Project Meeting will take place in Florence on Thursday the 18th of February 2010. The Programme will run as follows:

9.00 – 9.15 Introduction by Prof. Martin Scheinin, Professor of International Law at the European University Institute and United Nations Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights while countering terrorism

9.15 – 11.00 Identification of terrorist suspects through detection technologies: risks and opportunities
Chair: Martin Scheinin (European University Institute, Italy)

• Ehud Givon (WECU-technologies, Israel) – Security through intent detection
• Jacques Verraes (Europan Commission, Belgium) – Data protection issues related to identification of terrorist suspects
• Ben Hayes (Statewatch, United Kingdom) – Respondent to presentations of Commission and WeCU technologies

11.00 – 11.30 Coffee break

11.30 – 13.30 Human rights aspects of the use of detection technologies

Chair: Daniel Moeckli (University of Zurich, Switzerland)

• Roos van der hilst (University of Oslo, Norway) – Human rights risks of selected detection technologies - sample uses by governments
• Emilio Mordini (HIDE, Italy) - Biometrics, Body, Identity
• R. Leenes (University of Tilburg, the Netherlands) – Location based surveillance – why planes, trains and automobiles are the new castles

13.30 – 15.00 Lunch

15.00-17.00 Martin Scheinin presenting WP4 Deliverable on "Developments in the Declarations of Exceptions, Claims of Inapplicability, or Unilateral Modifications in Respect of Internation Law for the Sake of Counter-Terrorism"

Limited Places - To register, please e-mail mathias.vermeulen@eui.eu

Martin Scheinin on Body Scanners and Profiling

DETECTER Partner Martin Scheinin has a piece in the Guardian. He argues against the idea that the aim of preventing acts of terrorism always trumps privacy or other fundamental rights and that any restrictions of such rights ought to be specifically provided for in clear law ensuring their effectiveness, necessity and proportionality. A few select quotes:

...The current generation of body scanners entail an unnecessary and therefore disproportionate intrusion into privacy, by showing a graphic image of a naked human person to one or more observers. It would be technologically easy to avoid this, by securing that no images are ever stored, and by using an algorithm to replace on the observer's screen the image of a real person with a standard animation figure but places any suspicious items on that image...

What is worse, body scanners are ineffective. They are unlikely to detect 80 grams of PETN explosives hidden in the underware of a person. And once it is known that body scanners are in use, they are easy to avoid by hiding this type of explosives in a body cavity or in a commercial item in one's hand luggage...

There are better ways than body scanners and group-related profiling to improve security at airports and elsewhere. The technology already exists for detecting from distance most explosive substances, including PETN. Together with professional observation of behavioral patterns this provides a prospect of respecting privacy while at the same time doing a better job in preventing acts of terrorism. It seems to be the unwarranted obsession to know more about the perceived bad person that has slowed down work to detect explosives....

The article also features a link to his latest report written in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counterterrorism, highlighting the erosion of the right to privacy in the fight against terrorism.

News: New Security Measures for UK Airports

From the BBC: In a statement to the House of Commons earlier today, Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced the recommendations arising from a review of airport security and further intelligence briefings. The main measures include:

• Direct Flights from Yemen to the UK are suspended until security concerns are addressed.
• A "no fly" list is to be established to prevent suspected terrorists from travelling to the UK.
• A second list of lower risk suspects will be established entailing 'special measures' for those attempting to fly to the UK, such as more stringent screening (officials are not currently specifying anything further).
• All UK airports and ports to follow the 'e-borders' scheme, designed to collect personal data on all passengers entering or exiting the country, by the end of the year.
• Enhanced global cooperation to enable suspect individuals to be checked against watchlists 24 hours before flying to or via the UK.
• Full Body Scanners at British airports next week.
• New Intelligence teams to identify threats to British security abroad.

News: UK Equality and Human Rights Commission Say Body Scanners Breach Privacy

From the Times: Trevor Phillips, head of the UK watchdog created under the Equality Act (2006) in order to uphold nondiscrimination, has declared them a violation of privacy law established by the Human Rights Act.

They are calling on the UK Home Secretary Alan Johnson to explain in detail how the government will ensure that implementation of body scanning is compliant with the right to privacy. In particular they have raised privacy concerns with the use of body scanners on the disabled, the elderly, preoperative transsexuals and those with potentially embarrassing medical aids.

An EHRC spokesman said the use of profiling was “discriminatory, contrary to domestic legislation and international standards, and is harmful to community relations”.

A source at the watchdog added: “Scanners have a negative impact on people’s right to privacy, particularly the disabled, older people and children. Transsexuals and transgender people would be particularly vulnerable.

“We are talking about very intimate pictures. To be blunt, one could imagine a bunch of loutish security guards seeing some attractive women in the queue and all rushing into the office saying, ‘Let’s have a look’.”

Focus on Full-Body Scanners

Since the Christmas Day plot, many voices on both sides of the Atlantic have called for increased use of full-body scanners—even to the point of having them replace the now traditional metal detector screening. But how do they work and what’s the fuss about?

Operation

There are full-body scanners that have been developed that use x-rays (generally referred to as “backscatter” scanners), but the scanners that have attracted so much attention in the media lately are millimeter wave scanners. These units rely on waves that lie somewhere between microwaves and infrared light on the frequency spectrum. According to this article from the Austrian newspaper, Der Standard, human bodies naturally emit millimeter waves. In order to produce a clear image, however, millimeter wave scanners using the so-called “active method” bombard the body with additional millimeter waves. These waves are able to pass through clothing, paper, and thin plastics but not through human bodies. Thus, the reception of these waves as they bounce back from the body can be used to construct a picture of the outer surface of the body and reveal unusual objects hidden beneath clothing. Apparently, “passive method” scanners, which merely read naturally occurring millimeter wave emissions, have been developed and used in some airports (See e.g., this article from heise online (in German)). However, I can imagine that these scanners may not produce images of the same clarity and/or may require longer screening times.

Are the “active method” machines safe?

The jury is still out. The German Federal Office for Radiation Protection indicated in an article in the sueddeutsche that existing wave research has tended to concentrate on testing the health risks of waves used in mobile devices such as mobile phones. Therefore, there isn’t a great deal of research available on the health impact of these millimeter wave frequencies. What scientists seem to agree on is that the waves won’t ionize atoms within the body like X-rays and thus won’t damage cells the way ionizing radiation does. Millimeter waves will, however, warm the tissues that they strike. What tissues they strike depends on the wavelength of the wave. These waves encompass a range of frequencies beginning somewhere around 10 gigahertz and ending somewhere around 10 terahertz. According to the article in the sueddeutsche, waves at the lower end of that spectrum could penetrate a few millimeters into the skin. I don’t know whether current models of scanners tend to use waves around one specific frequency, whether they always send out waves at various frequencies, or whether they have frequency settings which may be adjusted by the operator. This article on the German Wikipedia, however, indicates that different frequencies may be useful for detecting different materials. For one official of the German Federal Office for Radiation Protection, the “big question” is whether the waves could cause other biological effects in addition to warming—such as bringing components of skin cells into oscillation or causing changes within the blood as it flows through surface capillaries. He adds, however, that these questions are “pure speculation.” For me, the question that always arises with radiation exposure is whether more frequent exposure will pose risks that don’t present themselves in simple, short-term testing. It’s not inconceivable that frequent flyers may have to pass through such scanners 2-3 times within a 10 hour period on several occasions within a single month.

Privacy issues

There are obvious privacy issues connected with a scanner that produces images of the naked body. But apart from revealing intimate parts of the anatomy and physical anomalies that an individual might not want to bare, the scanners might also reveal details such as that the person has had a colostomy, has incontinence problems, or is menstruating. Cognizant of the privacy issues, developers of these scanners aimed to develop solutions that would address them. Initially, the idea was to place the person reviewing the images from the scanner in a separate location than where the actual scanning takes place. Thus, the person viewing the image would be unable to see “in the flesh” the individual with whom that image was associated. Additionally, algorithms were introduced to automatically blur faces (an example of an image with facial blurring can be seen here). In this way, the image reviewer would be unable to link the image to an actual person. Of course, the problem is that colostomy pouches, feminine hygiene pads, devices that deliver medications or insulin, and the like still might prompt an embarrassing or uncomfortable confrontation with security personnel at the screening location.

Scan Tech: The Next Generation?

What if we could remove the image reviewer? Could we design software to do the reviewing for us and indicate where suspicious things crop up? One project led by Loughborough University that we heard about at the first DETECTER meeting in Birmingham was aiming to develop just such a program—one that could distinguish a bottle from a handgun carried in the hand of an individual captured in video recordings. We also heard from one of the manufacturers of a millimeter wave scanner who indicated that they were working to develop that kind of technology, but that it hadn’t yet matured to where it could be implemented.

But news reports today suggest that this “second generation” technology is now available and pictures have emerged from Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport which feature just the kind of generic, impersonal gingerbread-man-like graphic that we had talked about in Birmingham (an example is available here with a close-up here). Areas of the body that hold suspicious objects are then highlighted on the graphic, so that security personnel can conduct a search of that area. Unlike the original setup, the system in Amsterdam displays the computer-generated “results” directly to the personnel manning the scanner.

There are a few things to point out about this second generation of scanning. First of all, just because pictures in the media show displays with the gingerbread man figure doesn’t necessarily mean that the viewing of the “raw” image—so to speak—has been eliminated altogether. Secondly, I’m a bit skeptical as to how well this software will perform as compared with a human viewer. It seems like getting the optimal set of algorithms would take countless test runs and tweaking, and I imagine that there would still be things that the software would miss but that a human reviewer would pick up on, as well as things that the software would catch that a human reviewer would miss or identify as harmless (like colostomy pouches). Which brings us to the third point—that the software-based solution might result in more uncomfortable confrontations with security than with the human reviewer. Lastly, the software would rely on raw data from the scanner, and it would still be theoretically possible for someone to “reconstruct” the image if that someone had access to the raw data.

Access and Data Storage

The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) has obtained documents from the US Transportation Security Administration pertaining to the procurement of full-body scanners (For links, see this post on the LIFT). The procurement specifications indicate that the TSA has put significant thought and planning into the implementation of these systems, including privacy safeguards. Nonetheless, EPIC points out that, despite TSA’s public assurances that scan images could not be saved, the documents reveal that the systems would be able to store images when in “test mode.” Granted, TSA foresees different levels of access to these systems. In this case, only TSA headquarters, maintenance technicians, and so-called “super users” would be able to put a scanner system into test mode, and image storage would be disabled during normal operation, according to the TSA’s procurement specifications (see pp. 4, C-1). A note in Appendix C of these specifications indicates that super user access for a particular system would be disabled once the system was installed, suggesting that these super users would be representatives of the equipment vendor responsible for the initial setup of the system. Thus, for normal operation on passengers, that would officially leave just TSA headquarters and technicians who would be able to place the system in test mode in which images would be stored.

Nonetheless, this news does indicate that the systems have storage capacity. The question is how much. By limiting the storage capacity to only a few images, the risk of negative privacy impact could be minimized. Of course, the flip-side of not saving images is that it rules out the possibility of performing ex post re-evaluations. Suppose another incident like that on Christmas Day occurs, but the attempted bomber had gone through a full-body scanner. Would security specialists want to take another look at that person’s scan image (supposing they can identify it) to see if they can learn something from the mistake?

Open or Closed Network(s)?

Related to the issue of access is the question of whether the system represents a closed system or is linked or exposed to broader communication networks such as the internet. At first glance, I don’t see too many reasons why these systems would need to be connected to the internet. The image reviewer would not need to read e-mail or access websites to do his or her work. One advantage of allowing internet communication is that it would permit quick, uniform updating of changes to user accounts from a central office. Thus, if an image reviewer left his or her position with the TSA, that former employee’s access could be lifted for all scanner systems throughout the country more or less simultaneously. It might also be desirable to have uniform access at all airports so that image reviewers could be shifted around according to need. On the other hand, these same objectives might be achieved through other systems, such as physical access controls—using an employee ID card or the like—that would prevent unauthorized personnel from entering image viewing facilities. However, the ability to access remotely every system’s system log would allow auditing to take place on a more efficient basis. Thus, this point would speak in favor of network access. But I’m not convinced that the burden of conducting audits on the local level would necessarily outweigh the benefit of the added security. Alternatively to local audits, audit data (which does not include image data) could be exported using flash drives or a temporary network connection.

There are indications that the TSA is opting for the fully linked system. The TSA’s procurement specifications for a “Whole Body Imager” state that the system should support a minimum user database of 10,000 accounts (p. 17). That’s an extremely high number for any single airport. Additionally, the TSA’s operational requirements call for the system to have an “802.11X compatible” network interface (p. 11). IEEE 802.11 denotes a set of wireless network protocols. Thus, the inclusion of this functionality within the operation requirements indicates that the TSA would like to ensure that these systems are capable of sending and receiving wireless communications. The operational requirements also call for the network interface to be “configurable with an IP address” (Ibid.). This requirement suggests that there would be internet access. Lastly, the documentation requires that the system be able to interface with “STIP” (Security Technology Integrated Program) (Ibid.), which appears to be the TSA’s enterprise architecture for allowing communication between detection technology instruments in the field and central headquarters (See this entry on the US government’s “IT Dashboard”).

Summing Up

In sum, health-related risks are probably minimal, but currently unknown. In light of this fact, why not simply use passive systems that rely on the human body’s own millimeter wave emissions to eliminate any possible health risk? In terms of privacy protections, replacing the human reviewer with software algorithms may reduce the privacy impact for many but increase it for others. Eliminating network access would also substantially lower the risk that scan images end up distributed where they don’t need to be but could hamper other aspects of operations. All of these considerations come on top of the questions concerning the scanners’ effectiveness and necessity (See the last full paragraph of this earlier post and this from the LIFT).

Comment: Christmas Day Plot, Part I

“Failure to connect the dots” became a catch-phrase paraphrasing the mistakes within the intelligence community that permitted the 9/11 attacks despite the presence of intelligence within the possession of various US agencies that pointed toward the development of the underlying plot. This phrase has cropped up again in connection with the Christmas Day plot involving Northwestern Flight 253, leading to the question as to whether the lessons learned from the 9/11 review have been implemented.

As news of the attempted attack began to unfold, reports began to roll in that the individual behind the attempt, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, had raised a number of red flags which should have resulted in enhanced screening, potentially his detention for further investigation, or--as some have suggested--the denial of an entry visa for the US. First it was revealed that Abdulmutallab had been included in the National Counterterrorism Center’s TIDE (Terrorist Identitites Datamart Environment) database (more on TIDE in Part II) (See this story from CBS). Then, it came to light that Abdulmutallab’s father had approached US State Department officials in Nigeria with concerns that his son had “fallen under the influence of ‘religious extremists’ in Yemen” (See this story from CBS). According to a report from CBS News, this information was forwarded to officials in Washington (In fact, it may have been the basis for Abdulmutallab being entered in TIDE). Apparently, however, no flags were attached to Abdulmutallab’s US visa, and the CBS report suggests that US officials who had received information relating the father’s concerns did not realize that the individual in question had been issued a multiple-entry visa by the US Embassy in London that was valid from June 16, 2008 to June 12, 2010. Lastly, it has been reported that the NSA had identified communications among Al Qaeda members in Yemen concerning a plot involving a Nigerian (See articles here and here).

The Obama administration called for two reviews: one quick review of flight screening procedures and technologies, the other a more in-depth review of the terrorist watch list system in use in the US. President Obama has promised that the results of the reviews will be revealed in public reports in the near future. It will be interesting to see to what extent the details of what happened at each stage of Abdulmutallab’s journey will be released. For me, the following questions come up: 1) Were any personal data pertaining to Abdulmutallab submitted to the TSA before he boarded the flight from Nigeria? 2) What security procedures did Abdulmutallab undergo in Lagos (or Ghana)? 3) Was Abdulmutallab subjected to security procedures at Schiphol? It would be particularly interesting to know whether he underwent a full-body scan (such scanners are evidently in common use at Schiphol) (more on full-body scanning below)?

In this case, it isn’t clear to what extent fault can be found with US authorities. Clearly mistakes were made, but even if all the information on Abdulmutallab had come together and resulted in an operational decision, measures stemming from that decision would have to have been taken in Nigeria or the Netherlands in order to have been effective. The incident may primarily reflect the lack of uniform and coordinated procedures at the international level. The US has expressed the desire to receive passenger name records for all passengers who have booked flights to the US. Yet, the question arises as to how many airlines indulge that desire and with what level of accuracy. This requirement has been particularly contentious within the EU. However, given the fact that Abdulmutallab had booked passage with a US-based air carrier for the final leg of his journey, it seems likely that the US carrier submitted passenger record data on Abdulmutallab to the TSA. But again, even if the TSA had singled out Abdulmutallab for enhanced screening or identified him as being on the no-fly list, how does it ensure that Dutch or Nigerian airport security take appropriate action? If a Dutch or Nigerian equivalent of the TSA have special requests with respect to a particular passenger departing from the US en route to the Netherlands or Nigeria, would the TSA automatically comply in reciprocal fashion? Note that according to an editorial in the New York Times, the TSA can still request a US-bound flight to return to its point of departure if there is a suspicious passenger on board, but for long distance flights, this option may become unfeasible if the request is not received until later stages of the flight.

Suggestions for changes already began to be voiced soon after the incident. Among the calls for improvements to security that have emerged in public discourse, the notion of making more use of body scanners, such as millimeter wave scanners, has been particularly prominent--notably former US Department of Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff, has been among those advocating this move (see here) (although it later came to light that Chertoff’s company, the Chertoff Group, has a manufacturer of such machines as a client). Some commentators, however, have argued that such full-body scanners would have failed to detect the explosive device in this case. The Telegraph has cited two former US officials from counter-terrorism agencies for having long argued that swabbing for explosive substances and other chemicals is “cheaper, easier and more effective” than full-body scanners. In that article, Larry Johnson, former deputy director of Counter Terrorism at the US State Department was quoted as saying “[s]wabbing everyone is not hard and it’s just about the only way, short of making passengers fly naked and without luggage, of being reasonably sure they aren’t carrying a bomb.” Although swabbing would entail making bodily contact with the swabs, for some--if not most--it may raise fewer privacy concerns than the full-body scanners. The Telegraph article suggests that the swab tests would not need to be taken from the same part of the body or baggage where explosives were located. That means that contact with sensitive areas of the body could be avoided.

In Part II, I’ll discuss databases and watch lists.

News: New Kind of Body Scanner Researched

From CNN: Homeland Security in the US is funding research for a new kind of body scanner. Named 'Future Attribute Screening Technology', or FAST, instead of directly detecting criminal activity the scanners which would measure 'natural signals from the body' - things like heart rate, breathing, body temperature and fidgeting - to determine whether the subject was suspiciously nervous, say. The project has come in for some criticism:

Civil liberties groups maintain this screening technology is an invasion of privacy.

"Nobody has the right to look at my intimate bodily functions, my breathing, my perspiration rate, my heart rate, from afar," said Joe Stanley of the ACLU.

Comment: 'Naked' Scanners on Trial

There's a good post at SpyBlog on the news of Manchester Airport's trial of Rapiscan's 'Naked' Body Scanners. The post makes a number of claims:

• There's no 'safe' amount of ionising radiation.
• The fact that the 'viewer' is hidden in another room, a measure designed to make the process less invasive, raises some new problems. If you can't see them, for one thing there's no way the public can know whether they're being 'examined' by a man or a woman: for some people that is going to be a big deal, and may be particularly problematic for certain cultural or religious minorities.
  
• Defenders say no copies can be made of the 'naked' images (this has been repeated in a series of articles that have then illustrated the story with a digital camera screen grab). The system runs on a computer, so it seems inescapable that anyone with maintenance access has access to the images. Also, if the viewers are going to be in a separate room, how are they going to be prevented from taking pictures with a camera or mobile phone? Further surveillance, perhaps with CCTV cameras? I think setting up a system which is sufficiently thorough to rule out this sort of abuse without itself transmitting a further copy of the scanned passenger's picture is going to be difficult.
• The use of these machines on children may actually be a violation of the 'draconian, inflexible and often bureaucratically misinterpreted Protection of Children Act 1978'. I don't know whether this interpretation of the law is correct (the wikipedia article linked to lists 'prevention, detection or investigation of crime' as a legitimate defence). Regardless, it is striking that the law should be so intensely relaxed about children's naked bodies being on display as soon as the word 'security' is mentioned.
  

News: 'Naked' Scanners Now on Trial at UK Airport

From BBC news: Rapiscan Body Scanners are under trial at Manchester Airport. The scanners reveal clear images of any concealed weapons or explosives. However they also reveal clear images of the naked body - and any surgery, piercings or disabilities the person being scanned might have.

Manchester Airport have defended the trial, pointing out that the images are viewed in a different room from where the scanning takes place, breaking the link between the 'naked picture' and the person in question. They also point out that that pictures will not be stored.

Sarah Barrett, head of customer experience at the airport, said most passengers did not like the traditional "pat down" search.

At Manchester Airport's Terminal 2, where the machine has been introduced, passengers will no longer have to remove their coats, shoes and belts as they go through security checks.

Ms Barrett said: "This scanner completely takes away the hassle of needing to undress."